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Abstract
Educational institutions are known to be at the heart of complex computing systems in
any region in which they exist, especially in Africa. The existence of high end computing
power, often connected to the Internet and to research network grids, makes educational
institutions soft targets for attackers. Attackers of such networks are normally either
looking to exploit the large computing resources available for use in secondary attacks or
to steal Intellectual Property (IP) from the research networks to which the institutions
belong. Universities also store a lot of information about their current students and staff
population as well as alumni ranging from personal to financial information. Unauthorized
access to such information violates statutory requirement of the law and could grossly
tarnish the institutions name not to mention cost the institution a lot of money during
post-incident activities.
The purpose of this study was to investigate the information security practices that have
been put in place by Research and Education Network of Uganda (RENU) member in-
stitutions to safe guard institutional data and systems from both internal and external
security threats.
The study was conducted on six member institutions in three phases, between the months
of May and July 2011 in Uganda. Phase One involved the use of a customised quantitative
questionnaire tool. The tool - originally developed by information security governance
task-force of EDUCAUSE - was customised for use in Uganda. Phase Two involved the
use of a qualitative interview guide in a sessions between the investigator and respondents.
Results show that institutions rely heavily on Information and Communication Technology
(ICT) systems and services and that all institutions had already acquired more than
three information systems and had acquired and implemented some of the cutting edge
equipment and systems in their data centres. Further results show that institutions have
established ICT departments although staff have not been trained in information security.
All institutions interviewed have ICT policies although only a few have carried out policy
sensitization and awareness campaigns for their staff and students.
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Glossary
ARPANET – Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
BBUC – Bishop Barham University College
CISA – Certified Information Systems Auditor
CISO – Chief Information Security Officer
CISSP – Certified Information Systems Security Professional
DDoS – Distributed Denial-of-Service
DoS – Denial of Service
HTTPS – Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
ICT – Information and Communication Technology
IHSU – International Health Sciences University
IP – Intellectual Property
ISP – Internet Service Provider
IT – Information Technology
LAN – Local Area Network
MUBS – Makerere University Business School
MUK – Makerere University Kampala
MUST – Mbarara University of Science and Technology
NREN – National Research and Education Network
PGP – Pretty Good Privacy
REN – Research and Education Network
RENU – Research and Education Network of Uganda
SQL – Structured Query Language
SSL – Secure Sockets Layer
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Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Objectives of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Relevance and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.5 Overview of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6 Limitations and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.7 Document Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Review of Literature 7
2.1 National Research and Education Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 Source of Funding for NRENs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.2 Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.3 Types of Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 The African NREN efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Research and Education Network of Uganda (RENU) . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.1 The Objectives of RENU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
iv
CONTENTS v
2.3.2 Sources of Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.3 Membership of RENU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.4 Member Services and Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.5 Achievements of RENU Since Inception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 A look at the history of Information Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.1 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.2 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.3 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.4 2000s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 Universities and Information Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.1 Decentralisation vs. Centralisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.2 Standard Equipment vs. Diverse Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.3 Human Resource Budget to Employ Security Persons . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.4 Diversity of Business Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5.5 Diversity of Users . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6 Case studies: Attacks and Institutional Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6.1 Missouri State University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6.2 Massachusetts General Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6.3 University of California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.7 Common Attack Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.7.1 External Network Attack Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.7.2 Internal Network Attack Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.7.3 Wireless Network Attack Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
CONTENTS vi
2.7.4 Social Engineering Attack Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7.5 Attack Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.8 Security: The Case of Ugandan Universities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.8.1 Landing of Sea Cables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.8.2 Rapid growth in ICT Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.8.3 Relatively Young ICT Departments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.8.4 Absence of Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.9 Related Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.10 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Methodology 33
3.1 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1.1 Phase One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1.2 Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.3 Phase Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Participant Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3 Participant Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.1 Uganda Christian University (UCU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.2 Makerere University (MUK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3.3 Makerere University Business School (MUBS) . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3.4 International Health Sciences University (IHSU) . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3.5 Bishop Bharam University College (BBUC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.3.6 Mbarara University of Science and Technology (MUST) . . . . . . . 40
3.3.7 Participant Blinding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Grading System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
CONTENTS vii
4 Results and Analysis 43
4.1 Institutional Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1.1 Staff and Student Populations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1.2 Budgeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1.3 Computing Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.1.4 Information Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.1.5 Third-party Service Providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1.6 Wireless Access Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.1.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2 Infrastructure: Software and Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.1 Network Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2.2 Systems Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2.3 Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3 Human Resource and Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4.1 Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4.2 Data Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.4.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.5 Self Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.6 Interview Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.6.1 Changes with the Landing of SEACOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
CONTENTS viii
4.6.2 Central Authentication Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.6.3 Campus Wireless Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.6.4 Information Security Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.6.5 Blacklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.6.6 Physical Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.6.7 Operating Systems in use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.6.8 Border Firewall use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.6.9 IT Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5 Conclusion 71
5.1 Research Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.1.1 Research Question 1: “What is the institution’s reliance on ICT
systems and services?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.1.2 Research Question 2: “What IT security infrastructure has been
deployed at the institution?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.1.3 Research Question 3: “What is the staff composition of the ICT
department?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.1.4 Research Question 4: “What policies has the institution implemented
to guide students and staff on the proper use of ICT resources?” . . 74
5.1.5 Research Question 5: “How does the respondent assess the institu-
tion’s readiness to fight information security challenges?” . . . . . . 74
5.2 Validity of this Study and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2.1 Sample space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2.2 Respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2.3 Timing of the study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.3 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
CONTENTS ix
References 77
A Consent Form 86
B Interview Guide 88
C Survey Questionnaire 91
List of Figures
2.1 Map of Africa showing different Submarine cables connecting Africa to
Asia, America and Europe. Source: Steve [2011] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Network Diagram for the RENU Network. Source: [RENU, 2011] . . . . . 17
3.1 Map of Uganda showing geographic location of participants. Source: [RENU,
2011] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1 Institutional Profiling Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2 Infrastructure: Software and Hardware Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3 Human Resource and Awareness Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4 Policy Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.5 Representation of respondents understanding of security-related terms . . . 65
x
List of Tables
2.1 Typical NREN services to Members. Source: [Twinomugisha, 2007] . . . . 10
2.2 UbuntuNET Members. Source: [Zimani, 2007] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Summary RENU member Institutions. Source: [RENU, 2011] . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Summary of Security Breaches and Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 Summary: Participants Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Table Showing Role of Respondents in Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Grading Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1 Number of Staff and Students . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2 Information Systems used in participant institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.3 Summary: Staff Numbers and IT Security Qualifications . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.4 Respondents perceived security readiness of their institutions . . . . . . . . 65
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
The use of computer systems has greatly increased over the years since the first computer
was invented. Their uses in both homes and industry has varied from commercial compu-
tational use to complex nuclear systems and industrial control. The cost and portability
of computer hardware has greatly reduced such that currently almost every household and
business in the developed world can afford to own a Personal Computer (PC). The volume
data that is stored on computers has also enormously increased and this is attributed to
the evolving and reduction in costs of storage medium. It is increasingly cheaper to store
digital information on computers than in a traditional paper file system. It is not only
cheaper to store data digitally but also easier to retrieve and disseminate over the Internet
to a wider population.
The number of new nodes that connect to the Internet has been seen to increase substan-
tially over the years. The latest technology entrant, cloud computing and devices built to
access cloud services, have even further made a traditional paper file system even more
redundant.
Educational institutions are known to be the heart of complex computing systems in any
region they exist, especially in Africa. The existence of high end computing power, often
connected to the Internet and to research network grids, make educational institutions soft
targets for attackers. Attackers of such networks are normally either looking to exploit the
large computing resources available for use in secondary attacks or to steal Intellectual
Property (IP) from the research networks. Universities also store a lot of information
about their current student and staff population, as well as the alumni. Unauthorized
access to such information violates statutory requirement of the law and may cost the
institution a lot of money in remediation and law suits as well as ongoing reputation
1
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damage. Carefully designed and implemented information security practises can be used
to identify and mitigate some, if not all, of the information security attacks that are
targeted towards educational institutions.
1.1 Problem Statement
Universities store an increasing volume of sensitive information about current research
interests, their staff and student population. This information includes academic records,
financial records, medical records, employment history and correspondence pertaining to
the operation of the institution.
Originally such records were kept in paper based file systems under the strict care of
the institution’s top administrator. With the advent of computer systems, many paper
based systems have been turned into electronic systems. Information like this should be
protected by a series of practices such that it are only made available to those parties
that have the permission to access it.
Over the last two years, Uganda accessed high speed broadband Internet connectivity by
undersea cable. This exposed many insecure systems to the hostile Internet environment
and, as a result, a number of websites have come under attack by different hacking groups
all over the world. Some sites that have come under attack include government websites
and university websites. In all attacks the intention of the attacker remains unclear
nor what information has been lost or exposed to unprivileged individuals through such
attacks.
This study will investigate the information security practices, put in place by the member
institutions of Research and Education Network of Uganda (RENU) to safe guard this
information, as well as other computing resources on campus from both internal and
external security threats.
1.2 Objectives of Research
The primary objective of this study was to investigate the information security practices
that have been put in place by RENU member institutions to safe guard institutional data
and systems from both internal and external security threats. The secondary objective of
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the study will be to assess the security readiness of these institutions to avert any security
related incidences.
1.3 Research Questions
To achieve the objectives of this research, the following questions were used as a guide;
1. What is the institution’s reliance on ICT systems and services?
2. What IT Security infrastructure has been deployed at the institution?
3. What is the staff composition of the ICT department?
4. What policies has the institution implemented to guide students and staff on the
proper use of ICT resources?
5. How does the respondent assess the institution’s readiness to fight information se-
curity challenges?
1.4 Relevance and Background
Information security is defined as protection of information assets, aiming to maintain
confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability of the assets [Ahlfeldt and So¨der-
stro¨m, 2007]. Information security incidents in the case of a university can be in the form
of information theft, data tampering, viruses, worms and data loss [Burd, Cherkin, and
Concannon, 2005]. The source of security incidents can be external, such as hackers, or
internal, originating from both staff and students [Eminag˘aog˘lu, Uc¸ar, and Eren, 2009].
Universities are known to be soft targets for a number of reasons, such as the existence of
large number of computing resources that can be used in a secondary attack as zombies
[Cooke, Jahanian, and McPherson, 2005, U.S. Department Of Justice, 2010], and also
the existence of a large number of network users. As a result enforcement of security
policies is often difficult to achieve. Universities also get access to Intellectual Property
(IP) belonging to individuals and companies during research processes and this can po-
tentially be targeted by competition as university environments are normally less secure
than a company’s research and development laboratories. The Information Technology
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department of any university should be adequately equipped and prepared to avert such
incidences.
Universities in Uganda have, over time, automated various aspects of their business pro-
cesses through information systems. These systems store various records, including staff
and student personal information that should only be available to privileged users. It
is thus important that the universities take the necessary measures to make sure this
information is secure and protected from unauthorized access. External attack sources in
Uganda have increased dramatically in the last two years with the landing of SEACOM
Internet cable at the East African coast [BBC News, 2009]. This development brought
down Internet connectivity costs allowing all universities that either had no or slow Inter-
net connectivity afford high speed broadband connections to the Internet. By doing this,
university computer systems have been exposed to the Internet and only good security
practices can safeguard these systems from attacks.
In a study carried out in the United States of America in 2006, out of the 182 universities
and colleges that participated in the survey, 58 percent had experienced a security incident
in the previous year and of these 33 percent had reported a data loss or theft [Piassa,
2006]. It was also noted that 9 percent of the data lost was students’ personal information.
In October 2010, the University of Ohio announced that there had been unauthorized
access to one of their servers [Ohio University Press, 2010]. The University announced
that the information accessed included records of both staff and students. Information
included both past and present records. It was later said the university would spend 4
million dollars to offer credit protection to it’s users [Pyle, 2010].
On June 7th 2011, the website of Makerere University in Uganda was hacked. The hackers,
who claimed to be from Syria, replaced the home page with a banner in what seemed to
be a SQL injection attack. Since there are no statutory requirements in Uganda for public
entities to make such breaches public, the University did not make any public comment
about the attack but replaced the web page on the same day [Alai, 2011].
In August 2011, Purdue University announced that one of their servers had been hacked
in April 5, 2010. The breach was discovered three days after it had occurred. Preliminary
investigations revealed that the attacker had intended to use the server in a secondary at-
tack. However after forensic investigations which lasted 6 months, it was discovered that
Social Security Numbers (SSN) belonging to 7,093 former students might have been ac-
cessed. All the numbers accessed belonged to alumni classes that had taken mathematics
at the university between the years 2000 and 2005 [Data Breaches, 2011b].
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In August 2011, data that was stored on North Carolina State University computer server
that contained private information for about 1,800 school children from Richmond and
Wilson counties in the United States was accidentally put online. The data was gathered
from 2003-2006 as part of a research study on classroom practices. The data contained
names, Social Security Numbers and dates of birth. The breach was discovered after one
of the parents of these students found it online and immediately called the university.
The server’s Internet connection was severed and Google was contacted to make sure no
archived information could be obtained through Google Cache [Data Breaches, 2011a].
1.5 Overview of the Study
The study was conducted in three phases between the months of May and July 2011 in
Uganda. Phase One included the use of a questionnaire which was sent to respondents in
the participating universities. Phase Two involved the use of interview sessions between
the investigator and respondents. At this phase a tape recorder was used to capture the
proceedings of the interview. Phase Three was the data analysis stage in which data
collected was analysed for meaningful patterns.
1.6 Limitations and Assumptions
The study was conducted on RENU member institutions only. There are currently more
than twenty universities in Uganda. Only nine universities were RENU members as of
1st May 2011. RENU defines a member as an institution that has fully satisfied the
requirements for membership which include:
 Must be offering university level education and/or conducting university level re-
search.
 Organisations that are Universities must be established by Act of Parliament or
chartered by the National Council for Higher Education.
 Must have an ICT Policy and Master Plan.
 Must have a functioning Local Area Network connected to the Internet.
 Must have an established information resource management function.
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 Must meet the cost of membership as agreed by the launch meeting or reviewed by
the signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
All nine members were invited to participate in the study. Only six members agreed to
participate in the study.
1.7 Document Layout
The rest of this document is organised into four chapters as follows;
 Chapter Two introduces the concept of National Research and Education Networks
(NRENs) and gives a history of information security and explains how educational
institutions are soft targets for information security attacks.
 Chapter Three presents the methodology that was used during the study and dis-
cusses the choice of research methodology.
 Chapter Four presents the results obtained during the course of the study and offers
interpretation of these results in relation to the overall information security readiness
of the institutions.
 Chapter Five reviews the study and results obtained and offers conclusions based
on these results. It also offers suggestions for possible future studies in the area of
information security in educational institutions.
Chapter 2
Review of Literature
This chapter reviews the literature on information security in relation to universities. The
chapter starts by defining National Research and Education Networks (NREN) is and goes
on to introduce the Research and Education Network of Uganda (RENU) whose member
institutions are is used as a case study for this research. It will also detail the efforts of
some universities to implement safe information security practices and will also highlight
the successes and challenges that have been met.
2.1 National Research and Education Networks
A National Research and Educational Network (NREN) is an entity that is responsible,
on a national basis, for the provision of data communications networks and services to the
research and education community of it’s country. The NREN network typically connects
other networks at regional or metropolitan level [Twinomugisha, 2007].
The history of NRENs dates back to the early 1970s [John, 2008] where smaller sub-
networks of researchers operated in isolation and were idealfor supporting local research
needs. In the late 1970s, as computer systems were advancing further, the need for
researchers to work together, especially on common research areas that transcend the
geographical boundaries of countries and continents, was beginning to take form. As much
as there was an effort to interlink institutional research networks, due to the prevailing
technology the only means of interlinking these systems was in the hands of commercial
entities – telecommunication companies – through the use of telephone lines. The cost
of transmitting data over telephone infrastructure was prohibitively high which was a
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major hindrance to collaborative research efforts that were growing. In some parts of
Europe, governments had started to realise the benefits of collaborative research efforts
under NRENs and responded by offering high speed subsidized communication media and
funding the activities of NRENs. By mid 1980s Europe alone had eight research education
networks increasing to fifteen by 1990 [John, 2008].
In earlier times, it was believed that the advent of commercial Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) would replace the educational networks but that was not possibledue to the differ-
ence in business models of these entities. NRENs serve educational and research entities
and require huge investments and funding to get high speed connectivity links. Some
carry out cutting edge research projects [John, 2008] that may not have a specific time
frame to fetch returns or sometimes do no succeed as had been planned. ISPs, on the
other hand, tend to provide Internet services to everyone and tend to use stable network
applications in serving their clients. NRENs and ISPs tend to share a close relationship
in that the research projects that come out of NRENs will normally influence the type
of applications and services ISPs offer their clients. By 1990 there existed at least one
NREN in each of the countries in Europe that was either fully funded by the government
or at least actively supported by its government. The early research work at NRENs was
based on particle physics and space research, however, as the collaboration brought closer
educational and research entities, other disciplines realised the opportunity and potential
of the networks and hence began using them for their work.
2.1.1 Source of Funding for NRENs
Since NRENs are known to conduct educational and research activities and since gov-
ernments of any country are known to support such activities, it is desirable that the
government fully takes up the funding role of the NREN. Also it is easier for government
to channel its contribution to the education and research work carried out in the coun-
try to an NREN which normally encompasses all institutions, both public and private
[Twinomugisha, 2007]. However the experiences differ from NREN to NREN, for exam-
ple in BdREN [Khan, 2008] the NREN of Bangladesh, the funding model used is that
of cost sharing between the government and participating institutions. The government
funds some of the work of the NREN while the clients of NREN, the research institutions
pay an annual subscription. In Internet2 [Internet2, 2008], the NREN in USA, funding
is obtained from University Corporation for Advanced Internet Development (UCAID)
which is the organisation that brings together close to 170 universities in the USA as well
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as UCAID’s corporate partners [Internet2, 2008]. The NREN does not get funded directly
by the government although special funds such as grants may be awarded to the REN
through competition with other research groups. Also some NRENs start off as entities
within small interest groups of educators and researchers with participating institutions
funding the work of the REN in form of annual subscription or through winning com-
petitive research grants and overtime get funding from the government while in others
government offers the seed funding of the NRENs’ initial activities.
2.1.2 Membership
The membership of NRENs are researchers, students and teachers who normally are
represented by their institutions in the NREN. These institutions are from both the private
and public sector. The membership of NRENs differs from NREN to NREN with some
of the NRENs only including public institutions while others having a mix membership
between public and private research entities. The mix relationship is favourable as it
is more inclusive and easier for an NREN to be considered a National REN. NRENs in
some countries like USA [Vietsch, 2003, John, 2008] have expanded to include other
entities such as libraries, museums and government offices. NRENs especially in Africa
[Twinomugisha, 2007] have been discouraged from starting off as exclusively government
institutions as the success of any NREN is greatly a result of how many members make
up the REN.
2.1.3 Types of Services
The type of services that are offered to members of the REN differ from NREN to NREN
and are sometimes seen as competitive services that would be offered by a typical ISP. The
services are normally driven by the needs of the REN community and are implemented
as the need arises [Schelkens, 2006, Twinomugisha, 2007]. Some services that a typical
NREN would offer have been summarised in Table 2.1.
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Service Category Examples
Network and connectivity services Client connectivity to the NREN, bandwidth
management, DNS services, VPN services, NTP
services, IPv6 services and Network support ser-
vices.
Security services Anti-Virus control, CSIRT, Intrusion Preven-
tion, Vulnerability testing and netflow monitor-
ing tool.
Authentication and “Mobility” services Identity management services, server certifi-
cate service, Inter-(W)LAN/network access:
EDUROAM service.
Infrastructure hosting Web hosting, mail relay, disaster recovery, stor-
age area networks, academic software distribu-
tion and ftp services.
Network communication tools and conferencing Video/audio conferencing tools/application, In-
stant Messaging, Mailing list services and E-
Mail gateway services.
User interaction - knowledge dissemination Workshops, seminars, Support and User Portals,
User conferences, NREN publications, newslet-
ters and magazines.
Table 2.1: Typical NREN services to Members. Source: [Twinomugisha, 2007]
NRENs operate within the geographical boundaries of a country. However NRENs within
a region or a continent form an alliance or consortium. The alliance provides further
collaboration opportunities between not only its members but also between its members
and members of other alliances. For example the NRENs in Eastern and Souther Africa
are all under the UbuntuNET Alliance [Zimani, 2007] and these could be able to cooperate
on research with Internet2, the consortium of NRENs in the USA.
2.2 The African NREN efforts
National Research and Education Networks (NREN) are fairly a new concept on the
African continent. The oldest NREN on the continent, Kenya Education Network (KENET)
was established in 1999 [Zimani, 2007]. The efforts to start NRENs in Africa have mainly
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been fuelled with the need to find affordable means to connect to the Internet with many
NRENs starting off as bandwidth consortia. As a result, many NRENs are still offering
connectivity as the major service to their members and are not yet offering more advanced
services such as those seen in NRENs found in Europe and America. The landing of the
various Internet sea cables along the African coast to connect Africa to other continents
using faster Internet links has also worked as a catalyst to the establishment and growth
of NRENs on the African continent. Figure 2.1 shows the various sea cables that have
already landed on the African continent as of October 2011.
Figure 2.1: Map of Africa showing different Submarine cables connecting Africa to Asia,
America and Europe. Source: Steve [2011]
Africa has 53 countries divided into five regions; South, Central, East, North and West
Africa. A number of NRENs exist on the continent already and they are grouped into
consortia.
West and Central African Research and Education Network (WACREN) is the consortium
that takes up all the NRENs in West and Central Africa. The current membership includes
11 members from the following countries; Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger and Togo [Omo, 2010].
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European and Mediterranean connection (EUMEDCONNECT) is the consortium that
is responsible for NRENs in the counties in Northern Africa. The network was created
to connect NRENs in the Mediterranean region with those in Europe so as to increase
academic collaboration between the regions. Current members include; Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco and Tunisia [David, 2005].
UbuntuNET Alliance on the other hand is responsible for Countries in East and Southern
Africa. The NREN in focus in this study, Research and Education Network of Uganda
(RENU), belongs to UbuntuNET. UbuntuNET was created in 2005 by the then al-
ready established NRENs of Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda and South Africa.
It was later incorporated in 2006 as a non-profit association of NRENs with a purpose
of serving all established NRENs of Africa. The current membership of UbuntuNET
Alliance includes thirteen members; Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia,
Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanza-
nia, Uganda, Zambia [Zimani, 2007]. Information about UbuntuNET NRENs and the
countries they represent has been summarised in Table 2.2.
Country NREN Established
Ethiopia EthERNet 2001
Kenya KENET 1999
Malawi MAREN 2005
Mozambique MoRENet 2006
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Eb@le 2006
Namibia X-net 2003
Rwanda RwEdNet 2008
Somalia SomaliREN 2006
South Africa TENET 2003
Sudan SUIN 2004
Tanzania TERNET 2007
Uganda RENU 2006
Zambia ZAMREN 2005
Table 2.2: UbuntuNET Members. Source: [Zimani, 2007]
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2.3 Research and Education Network of Uganda (RENU)
Research and Education Network of Uganda (RENU) was founded on the 14th January
2006 by a team of Vice Chancellors of universities and heads of institutions that are
carrying out research in Uganda [Ali, 2010]. At this meeting, a Memorandum of Under-
standing [RENU, 2006] was drawn up and signed by all the Vice chancellors and heads of
research institutions to establish a formal and legal entity recognised by the government
of Uganda as the national REN by the end of that year. In 2007 RENU was registered
and recognised by government and allowed to carry out activities of an NREN in the
country [RENU, 2011].
2.3.1 The Objectives of RENU
The objectives of RENU as drawn up in the memorandum of understanding [RENU, 2006]
are:
 To promote and facilitate research and education networking among Ugandan uni-
versities and research organisations;
 To create stronger negotiating positions and get better terms for participating or-
ganisations in dealing with:
– Government and regulators on issues related to policy and regulation vis a vis
research and educational organisations;
– Suppliers of hardware, software, online resources, and bandwidth, including
getting benefits arising out of economies of scale;
– Development partners on issues of common benefit;
– Inter-connecting with other research and education networks worldwide.
 To explore ways of overcoming the high cost of information systems through pooling
resources and sharing, where feasible, costs for common software, and promoting
collaboration in areas that may include but are not limited to:
– E-learning systems to help deliver common online courses;
– Library information systems that allow members to easily digitize and share
their collections.
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 To explore new avenues for other value-added services as may from time to time be
needed in support of higher education and research networking in Uganda.
2.3.2 Sources of Funding
The funding model of RENU is member-subscription-based as the major source of income
and competing for grants and awards for capacity development in terms of equipment
sourcing and training [RENU, 2006]. Currently government support has come in terms of
waiving of taxes on equipment purchased to run the REN’s network while other donations
have come from external funders. Some of the key donors and funders [Ali, 2010] that
have funded RENU’s activities since its formation include Internet Educational Equal
Access Foundation (IEEAF), Global Medical Research Exchange (GMRE), United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), IDRC, UbuntuNet Alliance, Fostering
RENs in Africa (FRENIA), Swedish Program for ICT in Developing Regions (SPIDER),
West Indian Ocean Cable Company (WIOCC).
2.3.3 Membership of RENU
Currently, the RENU Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between institutions [RENU,
2006] does not discriminate against public or private funded institutions joining member-
ship of RENU but sets aside minimum conditions that have to be satisfied for an institu-
tion to be admitted.
Under the memorandum, an entity applying to be a member of RENU shall only be
accepted provided they satisfy the following minimum conditions:
 They must be legally operating in Uganda as an Educational entity
 They must be offering university level education and or conducting university level
research
 They organisations that are universities must be established by Act of parliament
or chartered by the National Council of Higher Education
 They must have an ICT policy and master plan
 They must have a functioning LAN connected to the Internet
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 They must have an established information resource management function
 They must meet the cost of membership as agreed by the council
The current membership of RENU, as obtained from the RENU website [RENU, 2011],
includes eleven members. These include nine universities and two research based organi-
sations.
Institution Funding Type
Uganda Christian University Private University
Kyambogo University Public University
Makerere University Public University
Makerere University Business School Public University
Gulu University Public University
Uganda Martyrs University Private University
Joint Clinical Research Center Public Research Entity
National Agricultural Research Organisation Public Research Entity
International Health Sciences University Private University
Bishop Barham University College Private University
Mbarara University of Science and Technology Public University
Table 2.3: Summary RENU member Institutions. Source: [RENU, 2011]
2.3.4 Member Services and Benefits
The main benefits enjoyed by RENU member institutions include [Ali, 2010, RENU, 2006]:
 Lower tariffs offered by ICT network providers for both Internet bandwidth and
Leased-Lines by the formation of bandwidth consortia.
 Technical support from RENU secretariat technical team which includes but not
limited to device configuration such as servers, routers, firewalls, and LANs for
access to the global Internet and also the ultimate education network that RENU
is setting up.
 Capacity building of member institution technical teams through specialized train-
ing sessions and sharing of best practices.
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The Bandwidth Consortia
Bandwidth has been seen as a major obstacle for many educational institutions to fully
utilising the resources that the Internet provides. In order to overcome this obstacle,
members of an NREN pool their individual connectivity resources into “bandwidth con-
sortia”. The bandwidth consortium is one of the key major services that RENU is offering
its members.
Prior to 2009, Uganda was accessing the Internet through satellite communication, which
is known for being very expensive. At the time, bandwidth in Uganda was priced at an
average of USD3000 for 1Mbps. Few education institutions were able to afford bandwidth
for Internet connectivity and many choosing to go for email dial-up solutions that were
offered by ISPs. RENU saw the opportunity in pooling resources from the REN’s members
so that bandwidth could be purchased in bulk and thereafter apportioned to the members
based on contributions made.
The landing of the SEACOM cable on the East African coast [BBC News, 2009] and its
extension into the inter-land to reach Uganda, not only brought the Internet closer to
the markets and end-users in Uganda but also managed to greatly reduce the costs of
connectivity. The cost of bandwidth reduced to USD680 for 1Mbps for the ordinary con-
sumer of Internet services. RENU through its partners and donors managed to negotiate
further with Uganda Telecom, one of the national providers of communication services in
the country and the back bone infrastructure provider of RENU to provide bandwidth to
its members at USD610 for 1Mbps [RENU, 2011].
RENU also received a donation on SEACOM of 10Gbps of capacity to NREN networks in
Europe funded by IEEAF. Universities have been encouraged to maintain their previous
expenditures on bandwidth at levels prior to the landing of the submarrine cables in order
that they can obtain more bandwidth from subsequent price cuts in the future.
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Figure 2.2: Network Diagram for the RENU Network. Source: [RENU, 2011]
2.3.5 Achievements of RENU Since Inception
Some of the achievements and RENU to date include [Ali, 2010];
 RENU hosted the UbuntuNet-Connect in 2009. This a forum that connects all the
NRENs in Eastern and Southern African. It happens every year and at these events
different NRENs share their experiences in running different activities of an NREN.
 RENU was registered as a legal entity in Uganda and officially recognised as the
formal NREN for Uganda.
 RENU managed to secure an Autonomous System Number (ASN) and public IP
space for its members use from AfriNIC.
 The network has eleven member institutions.
 RENU has already participated in a collaborative research with KENET the Kenyan
NREN .
 RENU has organised capacity building training events for it members.
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2.4 A look at the history of Information Security
This section documents the information security trends since the 1970s and how the attack
vectors and attackers’ motivations have evolved. This will give the reader a clear picture
on how these incidents have evolved over the years. The time line has been grouped into
decades starting with the 1970s.
2.4.1 1970s
The 1970s were dominated by the use of the mainframe. These systems, because of
their bulkiness, were confined to huge rooms that were physically secured [Morris and
Thompson, 1979]. They were originally manned by a single individual computer operator
whose duty was to execute punch cards on behalf of the users and giving the users the
results of their programs [Campbell and Aspray, 1999].
Later, terminals were able to be connected to the mainframe so that users could run
their own programs and receive results immediately [Campbell and Aspray, 1999]. The
security that was implemented on these systems was two-fold [Gollmann, 2011]; prevention
of unauthorized access to the system and keeping the information that was already kept
on the systems away from users who were not meant to see it. In the former instance, the
use of password protection was efficient enough as this meant that all who had access to
the system would have been given valid credentials to use while using terminal access. In
the latter instance, the use of encryption was ventured into to make sure that classified
information and files were encrypted to prevent unauthorized access [Gollmann, 2011].
For encryption the Data Encryption Standard DES which has been published by the
NSA was preferred [Morris and Thompson, 1979].
2.4.2 1980s
In this period, computer manufacturers had developed the PC. This was a standalone
computer able to do all it’s processing on its own. It was also smaller compared to the
mainframe and cheaper in cost. These developments managed to increase the penetration
of the computer into research entities, universities, businesses and homes that could not
afford the mainframe [Gollmann, 2011].
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This period is seen as the biggest backward slip of computer security because of the
following; the computers had become standalone which meant that one computer belonged
to a single individual, since the individual was not sharing it, they did not see the need to
secure the information stored on it, secondly the operating system that had dominated the
PC of the 80’s, Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS) did not support multi-user
environments and this was laxity in the security of the operating system. Unfortunately
most of the security challenges that were later seen in the 90’s had been due to this culture
that the PC had started in the 80’s [Gollmann, 2011].
In this period, the first network virus that was reported and documented was the Morris
worm in 1988. It rapidly propagated the ARPANET infecting at least 10 percent of the
devices on the network at the time. It replicated too fast that the systems were unable
to processes any other legitimate work. To contain it, systems administrators had to
physically shut-down their hosts that were connected to the network [Hoar, 2005].
2.4.3 1990s
The start of this decade was marked by the making of the Internet public. This meant that
all the smaller privileged hosts of the The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
ARPANET had been exposed to a greater network that spanned the whole globe. The
use of applications like email and web sky-rocketed with a number of businesses using the
Internet as a medium to market their products and to get in touch with their clients thus
eliminating the middleman [Gollmann, 2011].
Because the Internet was still being looked at as a communication tool or medium the
security that was implemented was the kind that was implemented in other communication
networks like the telephone networks. This included making the communication medium
secure and prevention of eavesdropping on messages along its paths [Gollmann, 2011].
This was an oversight on the engineer’s part because while the telephone network has
its main processing taking place at the core of the network with dumb terminals at the
end, the Internet had its processing taking place at the end terminals and thus having a
dumb core. The biggest security threat was taking place at the end terminals not along
the communication paths. The PC user had suddenly lost control of who would send
information to their computers and how they would do it. The original controls of user
access to computers was now lost because unauthorized users could access a computer
over the wire without ever coming into contact with it. Also a new challenge of malformed
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messages come to light with the first hackers being able to over flow memory and cause
the system to act in ways it was not intended to do.
It was also in this decade that the information security property of availability was tested
more as many systems suffered from Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [Gollmann, 2011].
Many businesses especially the smaller ones who had ventured into online business to
reduce costs of production now faced a challenge of being kept oﬄine with DoS attacks
that were rampant. A new cost of doing business, security incidences was slowly emerging.
It is in this decade that the use of firewalls and intrusion detection systems started to
appear at the edge of most networks.
It is important to note that the hacker in this decade attacked a computer or network as
his primary objective. And while most of the computer breaches were done by computer
experts wanting to show off their skill and occasionally for financial gain, it was never
their intention to maintain access for long periods of time [Gollmann, 2011].
2.4.4 2000s
This is the period that is seen as one where the use of resources on the Internet by con-
sumers is massive. It also marks a time when the Internet became an essential part of
doing business for the commercial entities. The Internet started moving from a paral-
lel communication tool to old communication services like the telephone to completely
replacing these services as the only communication tool in some economies in what has
been termed convergent technologies [Bertassi, Gabos, Korolkovas, Maia, Martucci, and
Spina, 2005].
The technology behind the Internet had not changed since the early 1990s but the ap-
plications that depended on the Internet were seen to increase and improve a lot during
this time period [Gollmann, 2011]. Because of the security trends, a new IT career with
security-related duties started to emerge and was being demanded by businesses and en-
terprises. A number of software and hardware was developed to protect the networks and
system users against attackers and malware. A number of online databases containing
exploitable systems and exploit code also sprung up in this decade to make sure the secu-
rity administrators and users alike are kept abreast with security developments that were
around them. As the network administrators got smart, and the network edge defence de-
vices like intrusion detection systems became more accurate at detection, attackers found
a new weakness, exploiting end-user desktop applications.
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The hackers of this decade also attacked systems as part of a long term strategy that
starts with the hacker gaining control of many computers and later controlling them to
attack a secondary target. In such a case, the attacking machine is referred to as a zombie
primarily because it is just following directions of the botnet master and it is part of a
botnet [Cooke et al., 2005]. If the aim was not to use these machines as zombies, the
attacker would maintain access to the victim computer and collect sensitive information
from the computer like credit card numbers as the user is browsing the Internet.
2.5 Universities and Information Security
Universities and higher learning education institutions all over the world have contin-
uously moved away from the traditional file system to more automated computerised
information systems. The systems used in various universities have been given vari-
ous identifying names and acronyms but the core functionality of these systems remain,
Academics Records Management information systems, Health Information management
systems, Alumni Information management systems, Finance information management
systems and many others. The implementation of all or some of the systems varies be-
tween the needs of the university and the costs of implementation of a given system.
Information security has been known to be inadequate on university campuses and this
has been blamed on mainly the lack of information security awareness for both students
and staff [George, North, and North, 2006].
In a study on IT Security Governance, Strategy, and Practice in Higher Education John
et al. [2003], the authors suggest a number of reasons why universities are unable to keep
up with the information security best practises that are recommended for industry. Some
of the mentioned challenges are discussed in the following section;
2.5.1 Decentralisation vs. Centralisation
Many institutions operate in a decentralised mode of operation, the schools and colleges
within the university are given autonomy of operating their own IT systems. Some schools
and colleges get donation and grants from donors and government which they choose to
manage separate of the central ICT infrastructure John et al. [2003]. In this case the
proper management of such decentralised systems is not very easy. It is not possible for
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the security administrator to easily know which systems are at risk. This can also be
partly blamed on the fact that some institutions do not have organised ICT departments
and data centres to work as central distribution points for ICT resources. The enterprise
is different in this regard with one central data centre to manage the needs of the entire
enterprise. Even in cases where the enterprise spans different geographic areas, there will
be efforts to manage the ICT resources centrally.
2.5.2 Standard Equipment vs. Diverse Equipment
The type of equipment on a university network differs in type and make. For example one
school many be using Linux operating system on their computers because of a particular
software while the other computers are running windows operating system or macintosh.
Even if the university tries to make the operating systems or machine vendor uniform it
is still impossible to have homogeneity since the students computers and other Internet
ready devices such as mobile phones will be different. This kind of heterogeneity makes it
hard for the security administrator to enforce policies across the board John et al. [2003].
In the enterprise on the other hand, there is a uniformity in the operating system and
the machine architecture that is being used, even when a particular department is using
specialised software it will be easy to manage since it is controlled by policy.
2.5.3 Human Resource Budget to Employ Security Persons
Many universities are usually constrained when it comes to finances and hence will tend
to cut costs in other areas not considered priority. Because of this, many ICT depart-
ments are not able to employ a single dedicated individual to manage security on the
university campus. The end result is either the security function being merged with that
of the network administrator or the system administrator or the function will be com-
pletely eliminated from the functions of the ICT department. The enterprise because of
the need to either pass industry compliance tests or to protect the share holders inter-
ests will normally employ a dedicated individual to manage the security function of the
organisation.
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2.5.4 Diversity of Business Activities
The university will typically engage in many activities related to academics and research,
such activities become difficult to identify for a security administrator, for example if a
university is engaged in pharmaceutical research a mail server with a spam filter that sorts
mail for Viagra spam messages and other products can easily eliminate legitimate mail
[John et al., 2003]. The corporate organisations tend to be in one line of business and in
which case the security administrators will always be aware of what business interests the
organisation is involved in thus making the deployment of security technologies easy.
2.5.5 Diversity of Users
The typical users of a university are not easy to categorise, universities employ staff
academic or administrative either on full time or part time, they have students on full
time and those on part time. Universities also allow guests academic or otherwise to use
university resources. Some universities tend to extend access to government services by
allowing the use of library resources to people who are not active students or staff of
the university. Because of this diverse nature of users, it becomes difficult for a security
administrator to secure and isolate users efficiently, the enterprise on the other hand will
normally have access for only staff, in few cases where guest access is granted it would be
with a locked down access John et al. [2003].
Despite the challenges that Universities and Higher Institutions of Learning face in im-
plementation of information security best practises, the cost of an attack or misuse of
computing resources resulting to failure or data loss need to be considered by all insti-
tutions. It should be noted that the cost of insecure systems is many times driven by
legislation and legal measures that a country has put in place.
During the course of this study it was evident enough that it was easy to find the case
studies of security breaches and the costs involved of Universities in the United States of
America (USA) while it was not possible to easily find the same information of universities
in Uganda.
The USA has a number of standards put in place to control how information and data is
handled, for example the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) [Federo
Register, 2011] which is most applicable to educational institutions mandates the institu-
tion to protect the staff and students information when it is stored. In cases where the
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institution needs to share this information, the owner for example a student (or parent if
student is under 18 years) must give consent. If also the students information is accessed
unlawfully the institution has to notify the student immediately in writing.
Uganda on the other hand has recently passed a Computer Misuse bill [Parliament Of
Uganda, 2008] which protects systems from unauthorized users but does not protect the
privacy of users who are the owners of this information. The absence of such legisla-
tion could be the reason information security breaches that have occurred in Ugandan
universities have not been documented.
2.6 Case studies: Attacks and Institutional Cost
For information security to be taken serious in institutions and business alike, manage-
ment and key decision makers need to understand the cost that attacks impact on their
institutions. Often, key decision makers will not prioritise the security of information and
systems of the institution until they understand the cost for non-compliance in monetary
terms. In this section we look at some of the attacks that have occurred in institutions
and businesses and their financial impact on the affected entities.
2.6.1 Missouri State University
Missouri State University staff unknowingly exposed 6,030 records of students including
their personal details and Social Security Number to the public. The lists of students had
been generated for internal use and was to be shared among the staff securely. Unfortu-
nately one of the staff mistakenly posted the lists on a unsecured public server and they
were consequently indexed by Google hence making them visible and available to anyone
on the Internet. The exact date that this happened is not known but suspected to be be-
tween October and November of 2010. Also the University was to carry out investigation
so that the staff responsible could face disciplinary action.
The University learned of the breach in February 2011, almost three months after the
actual incident had occurred. The University worked with Google to remove the lists
from Google cache and indexing. This university offered to pay the costs of Consumer
identity theft protection insurance for all the students affected. The negotiated cost was
USD 7 per affected students which comes to a total of USD 42,210. The University also
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had to incur costs of informing all affected students of the breach of privacy [Missouri
State University Press, 2011].
2.6.2 Massachusetts General Hospital
In February 2011, the General Hospital Corporation and Massachusetts General Physi-
cians Organization Inc. agreed to pay the U.S. government USD 1,000,000 to settle
potential violations of the United States of America Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Privacy Rule.
The announcement was made by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) after an investigation into the loss of protected health information (PHI) of 192
patients of the hospital’s Infectious Disease Associates outpatient practice, including pa-
tients with HIV/AIDS. Office for Civil Rights (OCR) opened its investigation of the
hospital after a complaint was filed by a patient whose PHI was lost on March 9, 2009.
OCR’s investigation indicated that the hospital failed to implement reasonable, appropri-
ate safeguards to protect the privacy of PHI when removed from the hospital’s premises
and impermissible disclosure of PHI potentially violating provisions of the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule. The documents which were lost on March 9th 2009, by the hospitals employee
who had taken them off hospital premises to continue work at home, were left on the
subway train as the employee came to work and were never recovered. Their contents
included, a patient schedule containing names and medical record numbers for a group
of 192 patients, and billing encounter forms containing the name, date of birth, medical
record number, health insurer and policy number, diagnosis and name of providers for 66
of those patients [HHS Press Office, 2011].
This case is relevant because most educational institutions operate on campus health
facilities in which they store student health information. Improper handling of such
records can easily expose such records to unprivileged individuals.
2.6.3 University of California
In July 2011, the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) paid USD 865,500 to
the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) and agreed to a Corrective Action Plan to settle al-
legations that UCLA Health System (UCLAHS) employees repeatedly snooped in the
electronic health records of celebrity patients. The OCR’s investigation was prompted
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by two separate complaints on behalf of celebrity victims. The investigation revealed
that from 2005-2008 employees repeatedly and without authorization accessed electronic
health records of these patients. Settlement announcements did not identify either of
the specific complaints, but in the past, UCLAHS has identified violations involving the
records of Drew Barrymore, Arnold Schwarzenegger, Tom Hanks, Leonardo DiCaprio,
Farrah Fawcett and others.
This was not the first time such an incident had happened within the same institution.
In June of 2010, a UCLA surgeon was sentenced to four months in jail for repeated,
unauthorized access to the records of his supervisor and celebrity patients.
UCLAHS’s corrective action plan requires UCLAHS to implement policies and proce-
dures approved by OCR, to conduct “regular and robust” employee training, to sanction
offending employees, and to designate an independent monitor who will assess compliance
with the plan over 3 years [Cynthia, 2011]. Like the previous case, this is relevant be-
cause most educational institutions operate on campus health facilities in which they store
staff and student health information. In the absence of employee awareness training and
lack of legislation, employees may be tempted to access client records without the proper
authorization to do so which in effect leads to exposure of such records to unprivileged
individuals and in some cases loss of trust between the institution and its clients. The
cases studies discussed in this section are summarised in Table 2.4.
Institution Attack Detection Cost(USD)
Missouri State University Insider breach 3 months 42,210
Massachusetts General Hospital Physical Loss 1 month 1,000,000
University of California Insider threat 2 years 865,500
Table 2.4: Summary of Security Breaches and Costs.
2.7 Common Attack Vectors
Attack vectors are the sources that attackers use to get into computer systems and net-
works or a means of delivering an attack [Spohn, 2011]. In most cases a security officer
will have to guard a system or network from multiple attack vectors in order to make
it immune to security attacks. Attack vectors can be grouped into; external network,
internal network, wireless, social engineering and application [Secunia, 2010].
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2.7.1 External Network Attack Vectors
These are attack vectors that originate from outside the organisations network. They
normally attack organisational services that are exposed to the Internet or will find a way
of punching a hole in the boarder firewall in order to access services that are hidden behind
the firewall. Some services that are normally victim to such attacks include DNS, Mail
services, and Web services. The attack vectors that are likely to be used against these
services can include Denial of Service and or Distributed Denial of Service, application
exploitation due to Zero-day [Fox, 2009] vulnerabilities that have been discovered in web
applications.
2.7.2 Internal Network Attack Vectors
These are attack vectors that originate from within the boundaries of the organisations
network. They are normally very difficult to avert since the users on the internal network
are normally considered non hostile and thus are allowed access to restricted services
and resources. These kind of attacks normally seen on the internal side leverage on
the minimal privileges that the users are given and will exploit system vulnerabilities to
escalate normal user accounts to super user accounts. Another angle to this is that the
success of these attacks greatly relies on the susceptibility of the human element. Without
proper policy in place, an employee can easily walk off the organisations premises with
important or classified documents [Archibald et al., 2008, Fox, 2009].
2.7.3 Wireless Network Attack Vectors
These attack vectors originate from the external network users. Since wireless networks
are bound to overlap the campus area that the organisation is covering, these attacks are
lethal to the network. Attackers can sit just across the road from the campus and still
access the network entirely. In many network set-ups, the defences are all put on the
external facing connection between the ISP and the organisation and the wireless access
points are forgotten. With a successful attack on wireless the attacker would access the
entire network as if they were sited inside an office in the campus. The most normally
used form of encryption WPA and WEP have both been exploited [Allen and Wilson,
2002, Beck and Tews, 2009] in the past, however they continue to be the most favourite
defences used by network managers.
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2.7.4 Social Engineering Attack Vectors
Social engineering is one of the most successful vectors used to target information systems.
It is normally used as a build up to secondary attacks targeted at the victim organisa-
tion [Pavkovic and Perkov, 2011].This is because the defences for this kind of attack are
more difficult to implement. Social engineering attacks involve mainly the attacker using
deceptive strategies to get the user to assist him in carrying out an attack [Hasan and
Prajapati, 2009]. The user might or might not be aware that they are helping the attacker
in the process. An example of a social engineering attack would be an attacker who posses
like he is from IT maintenance and asks the users for their passwords in order to trou-
bleshoot their computer problems. The user will willingly give the password because they
have been deceived into thinking this is a genuine staff from IT department. Defences
against such attacks normally require well structured and implemented user awareness
programmes which many institutions or enterprises do not have the man power to carry
out.
2.7.5 Attack Summary
In summary, it is important for a security officer to clearly understand the attack vectors
if they are to be able to protect systems and networks from attack effectively. In a study
carried out by the Secunia group on security incidents of 2010 [Secunia, 2010], it was
found that external attack vectors had been the most used by attackers for the year 2010.
They covered 81 percent of all attack vectors used that year.
2.8 Security: The Case of Ugandan Universities
Uganda, located in East Africa is made up of 111 districts. These districts are distributed
according to the regions that they geographically fall, namely; Central Region, Western
Region, Eastern Region, Northern Region and Southern Region. The country currently
has more than 30 both public and private universities distributed across all the regions
[UNESCO, 2009]. Universities in Uganda share many of the challenges that other uni-
versities in the world face in terms of security, but in addition also face unique challenges
that have made their systems more prone to attacks. We discuss some of those challenges
and draw a case why this study will be beneficial to the universities in Uganda.
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2.8.1 Landing of Sea Cables
Prior to 2009, Uganda’s access to the Internet was through expensive satellite links. Few
universities that could afford to pay up the cost to access Internet could only afford slow
speeds. The major Internet application that was in use was email. When SEACOM cable
landed at Mombasa, Kenya [BBC News, 2009] and eventually extended to reach Uganda,
the Internet costs greatly dropped thus allowing the entire country access broadband
Internet and at affordable costs. Many institutions were finally able to afford access to
the Internet at faster speeds which greatly enhanced the quality of education.
Fast Internet access does not only enhance access to Internet but also to academic research
networks worldwide. Institutions that did not have access to the Internet or had limited
access normally confined to academic and administrative offices were able to extend this
access to their entire staff and student populations. This kind of unpredicted access to
the Internet exposed computers in laboratories and offices that had never connected to
the Internet,to a hostile world wide network that has attackers constantly looking for
unpatched and vulnerable systems to attack. This kind of access to the Internet has
increased the external attack surface for the institutions.
2.8.2 Rapid growth in ICT Use
The landing of the SEACOM cable did not only make the Internet cheaper but had an
impact on the usage of ICT generally in Uganda. The reduction in the cost of bandwidth
increased the number of ISPs and consumer targeted data packages that were greatly
subsidised in price. In a way this increased the number of services that users demand
from the Internet and eventually the number of Internet connected devices that are used.
Devices like laptops and Internet enabled phones are now being demanded more.
In university environments, number of students with Internet enabled devices surged more
times than the administrators of ICT can plan for. This rapid surge in the number of Inter-
net ready devices that students own only makes it hard for a security officer to effectively
manage the devices on the network. Even if an administrator tries to effectively control
the security of devices on the network, controls cannot be effective since the students not
only access the University network but also access other networks while off campus that
do not necessarily conform to the same security policies as the university network hence
students are able to pick up a virus infection off wireless networks at a cafe´© or home
and will bring it onto the university network the next time they connect. Students who
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only use their laptops to access Internet on university campus risk bringing vulnerable
unpatched laptops to the network especially after long university holiday breaks.
2.8.3 Relatively Young ICT Departments
ICT in most Universities in Uganda has not yet been appreciated as an enabling re-
quirement for the wholesome education of students. Most institutions look at ICT and
Internet especially for the commercial traffic that it carries. The aspect of research and
using Internet to access research networks has not fully been appreciated.
As a result most universities are channelling their resources into infrastructural devel-
opment and are not developing the ICT departments capacity to be able to serve the
needs of the institution. For institutions like this, security is not a priority because of the
unnecessary immediate costs. It can be argued that the cost of insecurity has not been
assessed either as a means of showing universities the benefits of running secure computer
systems. Also in some cases where the ICT department has been established, there is
still an authority issue as many small departments opt to run their own systems because
they were obtained as a special donation or grant. This results in having critical systems
distributed all over the university campus thus increasing the sources of attack.
2.8.4 Absence of Legislation
The absence of the right legislation and security compliance standards like a Privacy Act to
protect students and staff data that is stored on University computers makes universities
ignore implementing security controls for the systems that they run.
Such efforts if enforced by government would encourage universities to maintain secure
systems for fear of being penalised or sued by their student and staff population for an
unauthorised access to their data. However even without legislation, universities should
be able to provide assurance to its population for the records that they obtain from them
lest they risk establishing a distrust relationship with staff and students.
2.9 Related Studies
The researcher was not able to find similar work done within Uganda and this can be
attributed to the fact that ICT security in Uganda is generally a field still in its infancy.
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However, in other parts of the world, a number of studies have been done focusing on
educational institutions and businesses as well. The following section discusses some of
these studies.
In a study carried out on two Universities in Tennessee [Nyabando, 2008], the results
indicated that the faculty and staff of the target institutions were aware of information
security issues and safe practices. The results also showed that the members who had
used computers for more than 20 years were more aware of the safe practice than those
that had used computer for lesser years. Password management and policy awareness
were identified as some of the challenges for the participants.
In another study carried out on “The state of information security in South-Western
Nigerian Educational institutions” [Ajayi et al., 2004], the results showed that 86 percent
of the respondents experienced security breaches on academic data or information, which
signified a major security problem for academia. 40 percent of the institutions had their
computers connected to the Internet thus making them easy targets especially for external
attacks. 82 percent of the institutions had no ICT Security policy in place for their
institutions and 83 percent had no security awareness programme which meant that staff
and students were not aware of the security challenges that using computers and the
Internet pose to their data.
In a study “Higher Education IT Security Report Card”carried out in the United States
of America by CDW-Government [Piassa, 2006], the results showed that 58 percent had
experienced at least one security incident in the previous year and 33 percent had reported
a data loss or theft. The report also indicated that the biggest challenge to Security in
Educational Institutions was, Administrations not regarding IT security with the same
urgency as other ICT requirements and this was evident with how little was in the budgets
to cater for ICT Security related expenditure.
In a study carried out by Gartner research in 2006, it was found that security threats to
institutions of higher education are increasing, but the resources that are available to deal
with these threats are often highly constrained [Lowendahl, Harris, and Zastrocky, 2006].
The following are the key findings from the study;
 Best practices for justifying and allocating security resources can result in signifi-
cantly greater effectiveness and efficiency in combating security threats in a sustain-
able manner.
 The most important step that an institution can take to strengthen its security
efforts is the appointment of a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO).
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 The failure to designate a CISO with a strong mandate could lead to serious diffi-
culties in driving the institution’s security efforts.
 Malicious-code and denial-of-service attacks are an increasing threat for many in-
stitutions, although computer theft appears to be in decline.
 Calculations of lost value because of security incidents are not performed by most
institutions, and the failure to do this can cause problems in justifying and allocating
resources.
2.10 Summary
This chapter has reviewed the literature on information security with relation to Uni-
versities. The chapter also explained in detail what an NREN is and introduced the
Research and Education Network of Uganda. A section was devoted to reviewing infor-
mation Security success stories and challenges that are faced by educational institutions
worldwide.
In order to understand the practices implemented by Research and Education Network
of Uganda member institutions, a suitable methodology was developed for use. The next
chapter discusses the research methodology used in collecting data in detail.
Chapter 3
Methodology
The primary objective of this study is to investigate the information security practices
that have been put in place by RENU member institutions to safe guard institutional data
and systems from both internal and external security threats. The study was conducted
by the researcher in person in Uganda from May to July 2011.
This chapter discusses the methods that were used to collect the data used in the study
and the rationale behind the specific questions that were asked of the respondents who
participated in the study. The chapter is divided into three sections; section one discusses
the research design used while section two introduces the participants who participated
in the study. The last section explains the grading system used and the rational of the
grading system.
3.1 Research Design
The study was carried out in two phases using a mixed method research; the first phase
involved the use of a questionnaire while the second phase involved the use of interview
question guide used in sessions between respondents and the investigator. At this stage
a recorder was used to record the responses of the respondent. Both instruments gained
the approval of the ethics committee at Rhodes University.
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3.1.1 Phase One
In this phase of the study questionnaires were sent out to the key individuals that had been
identified by the head of department of ICT in the participating institutions. Respondents
were required to answer the questions on the questionnaire that had specifically been
designed to ask the question “What are the security practices that are in practice at
this institution?” The questionnaire included five sections around which the Institutions
security readiness was to be assessed.
The questionnaire was designed with the help of the Information Security Governance
(ISG) Assessment Tool for Higher Education [EDUCAUSE, 2005]. The ISG Assessment
Tool for Higher Education was developed by the Security Risk Assessment Working Group
of the EDUCAUSE/Internet2 [Internet2, 2008] Computer and Network Security Task
Force.
This tool is designed to support the Information Security Governance (ISG) framework
recommended by the Corporate Governance Task Force [Entrust, 2008] and was modified
for use with Institutions of Higher Education based in the United States of America. The
Corporate Governance Task Force is one of the Task Forces formed by the National Cyber
Security Partnership (NCSP) in the US [NCP Website, 2003]. The NCSP is led by the
Business Software Alliance (BSA), the Information Technology Association of America
(ITAA), TechNet and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in voluntary partnership with
academicians, CEOs, federal government agencies and industry experts [NCP Website,
2003, Shore et al., 2004]. The role of the Task Force is to create a private sector framework
for organisations to improve ISG on a voluntary basis. The Corporate Governance Task
Force is comprised of forty-five members from industry, educational and not-for-profit
organisations in the US [Entrust, 2008].
The original tool includes the following sections; Organizational Reliance on IT, Risk
Management, People, Processes and Technology and was meant to assess the entire insti-
tution with the head of the institution such as Vice Chancellor being the main respondent.
For purposes of this study, this tool was customised for use on RENU member institu-
tions as well as assess the ICT Departments and their operation as opposed to the entire
institution.
The targeted key respondent was the ICT Director or any member of the ICT team as
nominated by the director. The sections in the customised questionnaire are, Institutional
profiling, Infrastructure, Human Resource and Awareness, Policy, and Self-assessment.
3.1. RESEARCH DESIGN 35
These sections have been discussed in detail in the section that follows. A copy of the
questionnaire has been included in Appendix C.
3.1.2 Questionnaire
Institutional Profiling
This section was meant to try to understand more the dependency of the institution on
ICT services and systems. It is in this section that the investigator hopes to understand
which systems the institution relies on for its day to day business, as well as the number
of system users both staff and student. Another part of this section sought to find out
the number of computing resources that are available to staff and students.
It also investigated the connectivity means that students and staff use to access resources
such as wired, wireless or off-campus dial-in. Results from this section will help the
researcher understand the number of computing resources as well as the degree of depen-
dency that the institution has on ICT systems and services.
It is from this that we shall be able to understand the level of destruction a security
incident can cause the institution.
Infrastructure
This section investigates what security hardware and related software that the institution
has already put in use. It seeks to find out if the institution has realized the importance of
securing its resources and what resources have been already protected. This section also
investigates if the institution realizes that the information security practices go beyond
the basic defences employed commonly by network administrators such as installing a
gateway firewall and installation of anti-virus on computer terminals and servers.
Human Resources and Awareness
This section investigates if the institution has realized the need to centralize resources in
one place as opposed to having small departmental resources that are distributed over the
campus. It also investigates if the institution has an organized ICT department and team
whose duty is to look after the resources that are available to them. We also investigate
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if the positions available in this department have security function either integrated or
independent of other positions in the department. We also investigated if the security
function has taken the initiative to raise security awareness among its users.
Policy
This section investigates if the institution has acceptable use policy and IT security policy
and whether they have been published or not. It also seeks to find out if policies have
been disseminated to the population and that they are clear and easy to understand. We
also investigated if there were measures to check for non-compliance and the consequences
thereafter.
Self-Assessment
The self assessment section was added to try and find out if the key respondent has an
idea of the relatively common terms that are used in the security arena. After the self
assessment, the respondent was asked to grade his/her institution’s information security
readiness. The respondent was also asked if they can suggest ways of improving their
preparedness.
3.1.3 Phase Two
In this phase of the study, an interview guide was designed to be used. The intention
of the guide was to obtained more qualitative information on some of the questions that
were posed on the questionnaire. The guide was sent to the respondent in advance of the
interview sessions so that the respondent could get a good grasp of the questions that
were to be asked. All the interviews took place at the participating institutions premises.
A tape recorder was used to capture the interview session so that the interviewer could be
able to fully engage the respondent without having to transcribe as well. The interview
guide can be found in Appendix B
3.2 Participant Samples
The participants of this survey are RENU member institutions. Since this was a study
of RENU member institutions, permission was sought first from the Chief Executive
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Officer (CEO) of RENU to carry out the study on its members. After the necessary
permission had been obtained from RENU, member institutions were also contacted for
their permission to be included in the study and seeking their full participation in the
study. All the nine universities that are members of RENU as at 1st May 2011 were
contacted seeking their permission for inclusion into this study. The request to participate
was sent on email to the heads of department of ICT departments of the institutions
using contact information obtained from RENU, the email requested that they nominate
someone from within their department who was knowledgeable about the departments
security practices and policies and who could willingly participate in the study. Six
member institutions responded positively while two members opted not to participate in
the study and one member did not reply to the invitation email.
The institutions that responded were Uganda Christian University, Makerere University,
Makerere University Business School, International Health Sciences University, Bishop
Bharam University College, Mbarara University of Science and Technology.
3.3 Participant Data
The study was carried out in Uganda on RENU member institutions. Six member insti-
tutions voluntarily agreed to participate in the study out of the nine members that were
contacted. The following is brief information about the participants.
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Figure 3.1: Map of Uganda showing geographic location of participants. Source: [RENU,
2011]
3.3.1 Uganda Christian University (UCU)
Uganda Christian University is located 23 kilometres from Kampala, in Mukono town, on
the the main road to Jinja. It is a private university, chartered and fully accredited by
the President of the Republic of Uganda, through the Ministry of Higher Education and
Sports, and the National Council for Higher Education. UCU is owned by the Province of
the Church of Uganda, and has campuses in Eastern, Western and Northern Uganda. The
University was born out of Bishop Tucker Theological College. The college was founded in
1913 in response to a growing need for pastors in the Church. Uganda Christian University
has all the necessities for an excellent education. It is recognised internationally and
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nationally. The Most Rev. Henry Luke Orombi, Archbishop of the Church of Uganda is
Chancellor, and the Rt. Rev. Dr George Carey is the Patron. Source: [UCU, 2011]
3.3.2 Makerere University (MUK)
Makerere University is Uganda’s premier public institution of higher learning. It is located
on Makerere hill, one of the many hills on which Kampala, the capital city of Uganda is
built. The main campus is about 5km to the north of the city centre covering an area
of 300 acres (Approximately two square kilometres). With almost all facilities serving
beyond the capacity they were designed for, the 83-year old university is the biggest and
most sought after institution of higher learning in Uganda. The University has made
tremendous strides towards the integration of ICT into its functions and operations over
the last five years. Makerere University offers not only day but also evening and external
study programmes to a student body of both Ugandan and foreign nationalities. It is also
a very active centre for research. Source: [MUK, 2011]
3.3.3 Makerere University Business School (MUBS)
Makerere University Business School was established by Makerere University (Establish-
ment of Constituent College) order 1997 as a constituent college of Makerere University
(MUK). The School was created from a merger between the Faculty of Commerce (FoC)
and the National College of Business Studies (NCBS). The merger involved the physical
movement of the faculty of commerce from the Makerere Campus to Nakawa where the
NCBS was located. The actual merger and movement took place in January 1998.
In the year 2000, the law was amended to give financial and administrative autonomy
by the Makerere University (Establishment of constituent college). As a result of this
amendment, the school structure changed tremendously. The law created a council with
authority similar to that of Makerere University Council. In the year 2001, the structure
of the school again changed with the enactment of the University and other tertiary
institutions Act, which made the school transform from a constituent college of Makerere
to a public tertiary institution affiliated to Makerere University [MUBS, 2011].
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3.3.4 International Health Sciences University (IHSU)
International Health Sciences University was established and admitted the first class of
students in August 2008. The University, owned by The International Medical Group
has its main campus at 4686 St. Barnabas Road, Namuwongo, a south-eastern section of
Kampala, Uganda’s capital and largest city. IHSU’s campus is located on the top floor
of the building that houses International Hospital Kampala. The road distance from the
central business district of the city to Namuwongo is approximately 6 kilometres. The
university offers it courses both on site and via e-learning platform Moodle [IHSU, 2011].
3.3.5 Bishop Bharam University College (BBUC)
Bishop Bahram University was originally founded in 1924 by Dr. S. Smith and L. Sharp,
who had come to Uganda with the Rwanda Mission. The purpose was to train Bible
teachers and lay readers for the Western region of Uganda.
BBUC sits in the cradle of the revival movement commonly known as the “East African
Revival”. Moreover, BBUC is right where the first educational centre in the Kigezi area
(south-western Uganda) was established. In the 1980s, the College rose to become a
Regional Theological College of the Church of Uganda for the south–western region. In
2000, the Church of Uganda Provincial Assembly granted the College the status of a
Constituent College of Uganda Christian University for the western region of Uganda.
This status was ratified by the National Council for Higher Education (NCHE) on 27th
of March 2006. The University is administered by twelve Church of Uganda dioceses,
namely Kigezi, North Kigezi, Kinkizi, Muhabura, Ankole, West Ankole, North Ankole,
Rwenzori, South Rwenzori, East Rwenzori, Bunyoro-Kitara and Masindi-Kitara [BBUC,
2011].
3.3.6 Mbarara University of Science and Technology (MUST)
Mbarara University of Science and Technology is a public University located in the South-
western part of Uganda, 300 km from Kampala city. It is made up of three faculties of
Development Studies, Science, and Medicine. MUST was established in 1989 following
a statute of the National Resistance Council, the then legislative body in Uganda. This
was In response to government’s realization that higher education was a critical asset for
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nation building, at a time when Uganda’s economy and social infrastructure had collapsed,
due to civil wars in the 1970s and 1980s.
The university is recognized by National Council for Higher Education in Uganda. With
acclaimed national and international recognition for best practices in outreach and com-
munity relations from Association of Commonwealth Universities, European Union , Civil
Society of Uganda, produces the best development workers and health care professionals
[MUST, 2011].
Name Region District Funding
Makerere University Central Kampala Public
Uganda Christian University Central Mukono Private
International Health Sciences University Central Kampala Private
Bishop Barahm University South-Western Kabale Private
Makerere University Business School Central Kampala Public
Mbarara University of Science and Technology Western Mbarara Public
Source: [RENU, 2011]
Table 3.1: Summary: Participants Information
3.3.7 Participant Blinding
During the study, the participants were promised anonymity for both their identities and
those of their institutions. For this reason the respondents names and their institutions
will be masked from the response data. Codes U, V, W, X, Y, Z have been allocated to the
participants and will be used in the rest of the study to identify the surveyed institutions.
Code Role of the Respondent in ICT Department
U Ag. Manager MIS
V Network Manager
W Head of ICT Infrastructure
X ICT Manager
Y Librarian
Z Head of Computing Department
Table 3.2: Table Showing Role of Respondents in Institutions
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3.4 Grading System
The questionnaire used for this study included five sections. In each of the sections,
various questions were asked and the grading codes used were A, B, C, D, E and F in
order to avoid biasing the participant’s responses. However, during analysis, each of these
codes has been given a numeric number to signify its weight, the numeric numbers will
be used later in the grading of the performance of each of the participating institutions.
Grade Value
A 1
B 2
C 3
D 4
E 5
F 6
Table 3.3: Grading Used
3.5 Summary
This chapter reviewed the methods that were used to collect data during the study. It
also included brief information about Uganda and profile information about the members
that participated in the study and the respondents. Also the grading that was used in
during the study has been explained. The instruments that were developed from this
chapter were used to collect data from the participating institutions. The next chapter
discusses in detail the results obtained during the data collection process.
Chapter 4
Results and Analysis
Nine RENU members were contacted to participate in this survey however only six mem-
bers responded positively. Despite the explanation that the survey was not in anyway
comparing members achievements, two of the members opted out because they felt it
would compare their achievements against the other members. One member did not re-
spond to the invitation. The study had a return rate of 67 percent. The chapter contains
the results from the study as well as analysis and interpretation of the results. The results
will also include a discussion section in which the researcher compares the results with
other studies that have been done around the world in both business and educational
environments.
4.1 Institutional Profiling
Institutional profiling was assessed using the categories of budgeting, staff and student
population, available computing resources, available information systems and wireless
systems and remote access. This section answers the research question of “What is the
institutions reliance on ICT systems and services?”.
4.1.1 Staff and Student Populations
It was found that 1/2 of the institutions had between 401 – 800 staff, 1/3 had between
1 – 200 staff and 1/6 had staff over 3001. It was found that 1/2 of the institutions had
more than 5001 students.
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The number of staff and students tended to tally with the size of the institution and also
the number of years it has existed. Institutions that have been in existence longer have
more students than the newer ones. Also it was clear institutions with more students
had slightly more staff which is reasonable. The number of staff and students has been
summarized in table 4.1.
Code Number of Staff Number of Students
Makerere University Business School 401 - 800 5001 - 15000
Makerere University ¿3000 15001 - 40000
Uganda Christian University 401 - 800 5001 - 15000
International Health Sciences University 1 - 200 500 - 2000
Bishop Barham University College 1 - 200 500 - 2000
Mbarara University of Science and Technology 401 - 800 2001 - 5000
Table 4.1: Number of Staff and Students
4.1.2 Budgeting
It was found that 1/2 of the institutions that participated in the survey spent between
UGX101 – 1Billion shillings (USD 36,000 – 350,000) on their entire ICT budget, 1/3
spend less than UGX 100Million (USD 36,000). When it came to expenditure on security
related products and appliances, it was found that 1/2 of the institutions spend between
10 percent and 20 percent of their budget on security related expenses and the other 1/2
spend less than 4 percent of their budget on security.
It should be noted that the components of the budget differ from institution to institution.
In some institutions the ICT departments payroll would have to be incorporated into the
ICT budget whereas in others the ICT budget doesn’t include payroll of ICT staff. Also
some budgets include expenses of computer purchase and other equipment purchases while
in other institutions these costs are considered capital and hence put in the institutions
capital budget. It also important to understand that some ICT department rely on the
ICT fees levied on students fees to run their budgets, in such cases the student population
will greatly influence the size of the ICT budget.
The portion spent on security products also varies between institutions, the biggest chal-
lenge was the fact that all institutions did not have on-going security programs hence
determining what percentage of the total budget is spent on security required critical
scrutinizing of the institutions budget to identify security-related products. Also one of
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the institutions mentioned that they do not spend on security products because they use
free and open source security-related software entirely in the institution. For such an
institution, expenditure on security was zero. In others, security software purchases like
anti-virus are handled within the central budget of the university hence not reflecting on
the departments ICT security code.
4.1.3 Computing Resources
Half of the institutions surveyed had between 301 and 800 computers connected to the
Internet, 1/3 has less than 300, and 1/6 had more than 3001 computers connected to the
Internet for student and staff use. Again here it was noted that institutions that have
larger numbers of students and staff populations equally had larger numbers of computers
for access to the Internet.
4.1.4 Information Systems
Reference is made to table 4.2 which shows the information systems and their distribution
among the universities that use them.
Institution
Security Area U V W X Y Z
Academic Records Management IS O O O O
Financial Management IS O O O O O O
Student Management IS O O O
Library Information System O O O O O
Learning Management System O O O O
Alumni Management System O
Email System O O O O O O
Website System (CMS) O O O O O O
Table 4.2: Information Systems used in participant institutions
It was found that each of the institutions was using at least three information systems to
facilitate informed decision making processes. 1/2 were using a Financial Management
System, Email System and Website content management system. The next highly used
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system was the Library Information System with 5/6 of the participants using it. The
least used system was the Alumni management system with only 1/6 of the participants
using it. This indicates that there is a high reliance on information systems and that
there is a substantial amount of data that is stored on the institutions network.
2/3 of the institutions stated that system failure would be critical to the business processes
of the institution internally while 1/3 stated that such a failure would be unacceptable.
2/3 of the institutions stated that system failure would be critical to the business processes
between the institution and the external parties like business partners and 1/6 stated that
such an occurrence is unacceptable. Another 1/6 stated that this would have no impact
on business processes between it and the external parties.
5/6 indicated that loss of Internet connectivity would be critical to the proper functioning
of business processes within the institution while 1/6 stated that this would partially
impact its business process within the university.
On the impact of Internet loss between the institution and the external business world
or partners, 1/2 stated that it would be critical while 1/3 stated that this would be
unacceptable and 1/6 indicated that this would have no impact at all.
The fact that institutions noted that information systems failure or loss of Internet con-
nectivity affects their ability to work internally and externally with partners shows the
dependency of institutions on information systems and also indicates that institutions
should take extra precaution to prevent such occurrences.
4.1.5 Third-party Service Providers
2/3 of the institutions use third-party service providers like software developers and net-
work expansion specialists to do department work, 1/3 do not use external third-party
contractors. 2/3 also use additional staff who are not on the institutions payroll to do
department work, such as interns and other support staff. This signifies that external
contractors and temporary employees do not go through rigorous security and credibility
checks done by the human resources department. No matter how complex a scheme of
background checks and security policies an institution has in place, ultimately the infor-
mation security of an institution hinges on the integrity and honesty of those who are
given access [Albertson, Briana, Dow, Kenneth, and Peter, 2003]. Many times the best
way to get into an organisation without being noticed is by posing as an employee who
will most likely go unnoticed because of their perceived right to access certain resources.
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4.1.6 Wireless Access Systems
It was found that 5/6 of the institutions had a wireless system deployed on the campus
for staff and student access and 1/6 had no wireless system deployed. Of those using
wireless access systems 4/5 were using some form of encryption WEP or WPA while 1/5
were not using encryption at all. It was also found that 1/2 offer their students and staff
means of accessing institutional systems off campus such as academic record systems and
email systems.
The use of wireless systems is normally encouraged because of its advantages such as
reducing the cost of infrastructure in terms of laying physical network and also providing
students and staff easy means of accessing network resources. However, the use of wireless
access can easily be abused by attackers to gain entry into secure systems using remote
access especially when the systems are not monitored or protected [Ben, 2004]. While
most institutions using wireless indicated that they use some form of encryption, 1/5
of institutions indicated that they are not using encryption at all. This poses a serious
concern because an attacker can gain access to the network without any effort. Even
though the encryptions in use WEP and WPA have their security draw backs [Allen and
Wilson, 2002, Williams et al., 2008, Beck and Tews, 2009], they provide a base barrier
between attackers and the wireless network.
4.1.7 Summary
A summary of the key findings relating to institutional profile are shown below.
 50% of the institutions had between 401 – 800 staff
 50% of the institutions had more than 5001 students
 50% of the institutions spend between UGX101 – 1Billion shillings on ICT budget
 50% of the institutions spend between 10 and 20 percent of their budget on security
related expenses
 50% were using a Financial Management System, Email System and Website content
management system.
 66% of the institutions consider system failure critical to the business processes of
the institution internally
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 66% of the institutions consider system failure would be critical to the business
processes between the institution and external parties
 83% indicated that loss of Internet connectivity would be critical to the proper
functioning of business processes within the institution
 50% stated that Internet loss would be critical on the communication with external
partners
 66% of the institutions use third-party service providers like software developers
 66% also use additional staff who are not on the institution’s payroll to do depart-
ment work
 83% of the institutions had a wireless system deployed on the campus for staff and
student access
 50% offer their students and staff means of accessing institutional systems off campus
such as academic record systems and email systems
The overall reliance on ICT systems and services for the institutions was found to be high.
The total points that could have been obtained by any institution in this section was 40.
From figure 4.1, it can be seen that most of the institutions scored more than average,
20, for this section hence reflecting the high reliance on ICT systems and services for the
institutions.
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Figure 4.1: Institutional Profiling Summary
4.2 Infrastructure: Software and Hardware
Infrastructure was assessed using the categories of Network, Systems and disaster recovery.
This section addresses the research question of “What IT Security infrastructure has been
deployed at the institution?”
4.2.1 Network Infrastructure
On whether Internet-accessible servers are protected by one or more security layer(s), 1/3
indicated that they have “fully implemented” this while the rest of the participants are
working towards having this implemented.
5/6 indicated that they have “fully implemented” specific measures to secure remote
access to their servers while 1/6 indicated that they have “partially implemented” this.
5/6 indicated that they have “fully implemented” means to monitor and secure the servers
that monitor their domain which include DNS and DHCP servers, 1/6 indicated that they
have “partially implemented” this.
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1/2 indicated that they have “fully implemented” policies that guide system and config-
uration changes done 1/6 have “not implemented” this.
The results show that the institutions have already implemented one or more security
layer(s) to protect their systems. Security layers are ways of providing various security
techniques to protect enterprise resources for example for network traffic that is coming
into the LAN from the Internet the institution implements a firewall to filter this traffic to
prevent unwanted traffic from entering the network, behind the firewall the security admin-
istrator can have and Intrusion Detection System/Intrusion Protection System IDS/IPS
to alert of any successful intrusions through the firewall.
At application level, the security administrator can have an application firewall that is able
to filter traffic sorting out malformed requests that are made to the application. For traffic
that is generated within the institution, the security administrator can use authentication
mechanisms to grant users access to the network and also use access control lists to limit
their work to only duties that they are allowed to do. These layers of security however,
are meant to provide extra security to systems and services but should not be thought of
as the ultimate solution to security issues.
Vulnerability Management
Four of the respondants (2/3) indicated that they have “partially implemented” a strategy
to scan their systems and applications periodically for vulnerabilities and as well as in-
tegrity of configuration files. While 1/6 indicated that they have “not implemented” this
strategy. 1/6 also indicated that they continuously monitor in real time their networks
and systems for unauthorized access and anomalies such as viruses and worms.
Vulnerabilities are weakness in software and hardware systems that are a result of bugs or
misconfiguration and give attackers ways of violating rules of procedure for the systems in
which they exist. Vulnerabilities that are detected can normally be mitigated by applying
a vendor provided patch or change in configuration for poorly configured scripts. Also
another challenge that presents itself is the existence of custom software applications that
are supported by developers with no appreciation of secure coding practices. This presents
institutions with vulnerabilities that may not be easily fixed and on time.
Typical tools used for identifying and classifying known vulnerabilities are vulnerabil-
ity scanners. These tools look for vulnerabilities known and reported by the security
community, and which typically are already fixed by relevant vendors with patches and
4.2. INFRASTRUCTURE: SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE 51
security updates. Also commercial software exists whose sole role is to constantly monitor
applications for vulnerabilities and notify security administrators of a new vulnerability.
The lapse between the discovered vulnerability and the vendors ability to patch against
it present a zero-day vulnerability which is every administrator’s nightmare. Regular
scanning of applications is hence very necessary to be able to identify vulnerable software
and systems so that the security administrator can consequently patch the systems and
software.
Logging
Two institutions indicated that they have “fully implemented” logging for security-related
activities such as hardware configuration changes, software configuration changes, access
attempts and privilege assignments, 2/3 have “partially implemented” or “not imple-
mented” this at all.
Logging is a very important aspect of systems and network security. Logs not only
provide troubleshooting information to the system administrators but can also be used
to audit user activities on the network such as privilege escalations and attempted logins.
Log monitoring should hence be one of the duties of a security administrator and also
carried out regularly. Logging can vary from logging configuration changes to logging
authentication attempted and file access.
Normally policy will dictate the type of logs that are monitored from systems and how
long such logs should be kept for analysis and reference purposes. Systems such as Linux
offer automatic logging and log rotation facilities on default install.
Rogue Access Points
The majority (2/3) indicated that they have “not implemented” a means of preventing
and detecting rogue access to their wireless networks while 1/6 indicated that they are
“close to completion: or “fully implemented” this strategy.
Rogue access points are normally wireless access points that are installed on to a secure
network environment without the permission of the network or security administrator.
Rogue access points can be installed by innocent network users or attackers with the
intent of gaining unauthorized access to the internal network. These access points extend
network access to the interested parties with less means of being detected because of the
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portability of access points and lack a clear policy on who should be installing devices
on the network. Successful planting of an access point on a network allows the attacker
to access the LAN remotely and use LAN resources like he/she is part of the network.
Access can be intended for the primary network or in order to use the LAN to launch
secondary attacks on another network over the Internet. By all measure, the security
administrator should devise means of detecting such rouge access because of the security
challenges that they present.
4.2.2 Systems Infrastructure
1/2 indicated that they have “fully implemented” the encryption of sensitive data and
the encryption keys are kept safe while 1/3 indicated that they have “not implemented”
this.
1/2 indicated that they have “fully implemented” a mechanisms to manage digital iden-
tities from through out their life cycle from creation to deletion while 1/3 have “partially
implemented” and 1/6 have “not implemented” this at all.
Data encryption
Encryption is a way of converting data into a form (cipher text) that cannot be understood
by listening parties other than the parties it is intended for. Encryption can take place
during data transfer and or during storage. Data during transfer is normally encrypted
with protocols such as SSL, HTTPS [Lee, Malkin, and Nahum, 2007]. The means of
encrypting and decrypting data are as important as the keys that are used in the process.
Keys are a means to encrypt and decrypt data and these keys should be stored well as
mismanagement of the same renders the whole data encryption process useless. Data
encryption presents a way to secure the owners of the data like students and staff from
unintended disclosure which reveals personal information that is otherwise private.
There are two types of encryption asymmetric and symmetric [Fujisaki and Okamoto,
1999]. Asymmetric also sometimes refereed to a public key depends of use or two keys,
public and private. A users public key is available to all those who intend to transmit
a message to them over the Internet while the user will use his private key to decrypt
this message, the hugest implementation for this is the PGP [Henry, 2000]. Symmetric
encryption means that the same key that is used to encrypt data should be used to decrypt
it. Information in an institution is mainly moving between accounting systems and banks,
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between academic records systems or is stored on systems. Encrypting it along the way
protects it from unintended disclosure.
Identity management
All but one (5/6) of the institutions indicated that their systems use automatic password
changes while one indicated that this not implemented at all. Firther, of those that had
some implementation, two indicated that they have “fully implemented” system session
time out and user management practices while one had “not implemented” this at all.
Only two institutions indicated that they have “not implemented” the use of a single
database for authentication across all systems while 1/6 have “fully implemented” this.
Identity management is a very important aspect of managing users on a system or network.
Identity management can be used to manage individuals identities as they go about
their duties and how they interact with information resources. Users can further be
organised in groups and assigned different permissions with access control lists in order
to further facilitate the sharing of resources on the network. In an identity management
system, identities go through a life cycle that includes creation, management and deletion
at the end of life cycle of the identity. Academic institutions, because of the different
activities and information systems that exist are encouraged to have some form of identity
management to ease the way users are granted access and rights to use and view certain
pieces of information. The large number of systems is met with a large number of users
with a diversified range of requirements to operate computer resources.
A number of university systems have been hacked into because they have identities of
past students that were never terminated or forgotten about. The best way to manage
identities in a university is to use a central authentication and identity system such as
Light weight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [Alvestrand, Hodges, Morgan, and Wahl,
2000]. LDAP offers a protocol to connect to and manage a global directory of users who are
allowed to authenticate on systems. it can also be use to manage user profiles throughout
their life cycle.
Central Anti Virus and Patching
5/6 indicated that they have “fully implemented” central anti-virus protection and con-
trol for both their servers and workstations. 1/6 indicated that they have “partially
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implemented” this strategy. Of those that have fully implemented central anti-virus man-
agement, only 2/5 have “fully implemented” strategy to audit whether all clients and
servers regularly get updated virus definitions.
1/2 indicated that they have “fully implemented” a strategy to update all server and
client computers with the latest operating system patches.
For institutions that are running hundreds of computers, it becomes efficient to have some
form of central management for anti-virus and patch management. This control should of-
fer ways of auditing to make sure that the systems are updated and have patches. Central
monitoring offers a number of advantages such as reducing overall systems management
reducing the number of supervision visits that the systems administrator has to make
around the institution to make sure that all systems are updated. This reduces the num-
ber of machines that can be overweighted to being up-to-date and yet they are not. It also
reduces the number of machines that connect to the Internet to download updates with
a central dissemination of patches and virus definitions. In order to completely protect
the entire network, anti-virus protection should be extended to student and staff personal
laptops and mobile computing devices. Devices especially students devices are used to
connect to the Internet on various wireless connections that may not be as secure as the
university network hence a student is bound to pick up a virus infection and infect the
whole university network once they connect again at the institution.
4.2.3 Disaster Recovery
2/3 indicated that they are “close to completion” or have “fully implemented” a system
backup strategy while 1/3 have “not implemented” a backup strategy. Of these 3/4 also
indicated that their backup strategy covers all critical systems in the institution. Only
1/4 indicated that they periodically test the backup strategy to make sure recovery is
possible.
Backup is a very important aspect of information security processes. This is because,
in pursuit of automation, universities have acquired a number of systems to enhance the
smooth running of the institution. These systems collect a vast amount of information
that is used in making key business decisions. Loss of such information due to system
failure, virus attack, software problems, external attacks, and internal employee attacks
[Landry and Koger, 2006] can easily cripple the institution not to mention legal suits.
The kind of data that is collected in any institution is sometimes not replaceable, this
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include students information, staff information, financial information and other sorts of
data stored. Good backup procedures can help restore data that has been lost due to any
of the cause and reduce considerably to amount of down time.
All the institutions that participated in this survey had at least three information systems
that are already implemented, such developments show that the dependency on computer
systems is high on all institutions. The use of information systems brings to mind the
need for adequately disaster recovery planning to reduce the risks that arise out of disaster
situations.
A good backup system should include all systems that are used in the institution, in
determining the systems to back up and those to ignore, the backup coordinator needs to
make sure that the institution is able to work at 100 percent after the incidents and this
means that all critical systems need to be backup.
It is important to make sure that the backup systems do actually work, it is considered
useless to have a backup system that cannot be restored from. System restoration tests
should be done as well as time to restoration accounted for, the business needs to know
in times of disaster what time frame it will take to restore normal operations.
4.2.4 Summary
 more than 50% of the institutions have implemented one or more security layer(s)
 more than 66% of the institutions scan their systems for application vulnerabilities
 16% have fully implemented a means to constantly monitor their networks
 33% of the institutions currently monitor logging for security-related changes such
as hardware changes
 66% have not implemented a way to prevent and detect rogue access to their wireless
networks
 83% have implemented specific measures to secure remote access to their servers
 50% have polices that guide system and configuration changes
 50% of the institutions encrypt sensitive data and the encryption keys are kept safe
 50% have mechanisms to manage digital identities throughout their life cycle
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 66% do not have automatic password changes
 83% have partially or fully implemented system session time out
 50% are not using a single database for authentication across all systems
 83% have fully implemented central anti-virus management
 50% have their systems regularly check for updates on a central server
 66% already have a backup strategy or are almost completing it
 33% have their backup system include all major systems
 66% have tested their backup for successful restoration
Overall, all institutions have the necessary ICT infrastructure (software and hardware) to
form a base protection against information security attacks. As seen from the figure 4.2
below, most of the institutions except W achieved more than half the total points that
could be accumulated by any one institution in this section. The observation is that while
the institutions scored highly for possession of infrastructure, most of them lost points
mainly around questions of implementation strategies.
Figure 4.2: Infrastructure: Software and Hardware Summary
4.3. HUMAN RESOURCE AND AWARENESS 57
4.3 Human Resource and Awareness
Human resource and awareness was assessed using the staff composition for the ICT
department and the ICT security awareness programs that an institutions has in place.
This section answers the question “What is the staff composition of the ICT department?”
The table below shows the number of ICT staff in each of the institutions and the security-
related qualifications that they have.
Institution ICT Staff Security Staff Security Qualifications
U 15 3 Certified Network and Security Professional
V 30 0 Cyber Security Workshop attended
W 24 1 Offensive Security Certified Professional
X 4 1 None
Y 3 1 None
Z 5 1 None
Table 4.3: Summary: Staff Numbers and IT Security Qualifications
Two thirds of surveyed institutions indicated that they have an organised department
whose role is to oversee the use of information technology resources on campus while
the rest have “partially implemented” this or are “close to completion”. Two thirds of
surveyed institutions indicated that they have “partially implemented” the strategy to
have a security function as one of the duties of the ICT personnel while the rest indicated
they have “fully implemented” this and that their security function has the authority
it needs to manage and ensure compliance with the information security program. All
but one of the surveyed institutions indicated that they have made efforts to have ICT
personnel train in security related courses
Two thirds of surveyed institutions ,when asked if they have an ICT security awareness
program that caters for the whole institution, indicated “partial implementation” while
the rest indicated “not implemented”.
Two thirds of surveyed institutions indicated that their institutions do not carry out
background checks on ICT employees while the rest indicated that they do carry out
background checks.
Two thirds of surveyed institutions indicated that they have “fully implemented” data
centres for their institution while the rest are working towards achieving this.
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ICT Human Resource
It is important for any institution to have an ICT department whose role is to manage
ICT resources that are on campus. These resources include computer terminals, servers,
printers, telephone handsets etc. Having a single entity to manage all these resources
makes one department accountable to all others for ICT services.
Having an ICT department is the first step to having an organised ICT environment. The
second step is equipping it with staff who have the skill that mandate the work that the
department oversees. The skills that are normally found in departments should include
the director, database administrator, systems administrator, network administrator and
support specialists, some roles merge the ones listed but these are the basic roles. All
roles in the department should have the mandate to execute their duties, the security
administrators role should be to oversee the departments execution of the ICT policy and
its compliance by the staff members. It is important to note that all institutions have ICT
departments which is a good sign. Also the numbers of staff in the departments varied
but seemed to support the deduction that universities that have more user populations
and have been in existence longer had more staff in the ICT departments than their newer
and smaller counterparts.
ICT staff training is one of the responsibilities of the human resources department that
should be implemented in order to equip the staff to face the ever changing ICT industry.
The ICT field is continuously changing and universities are some of the entities that
are normally at the fore front of this execution and implementation of cutting age ICT
infrastructure. It is in the benefit of the university to keep staff up-to-date with the ICT
trends.
Training should also include security-related training. Whether or not the institution
has a dedicated security staff member, all staff should be able to undergo basic infor-
mation security training. This kind of training does not only assist staff in detecting
insecure procedures and practises but helps them interpret policy and be able to assist
in its enforcement. For example, as much as some institutions had information security
professionals on their teams, none had industry standard certifications like the Certified
Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP).
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4.3.1 Summary
 All institutions have either a fully functional ICT department or working towards
one
 33% of the members have an ICT security function
 83% have taken their staff for ICT security related courses
 66% have an on-going security awareness program
 66% do not carry out background checks on their staff
 66% have established data centres
Overall, more than half the institutions have an organised ICT department that is staffed
with various professionals. As much as only one institution did not have a security pro-
fessional among its staff, even those that did, have not equipped the security professional
to carry out their duties. Also only one institution is currently doing background checks
for their staff during the employment process.
Figure 4.3: Human Resource and Awareness Summary
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4.4 Policy
Policy was assessed using the existing policies that have been implemented by the ICT
department and the measures taken to enforce policies and compliance. This section
answers the question “What Policies has the institution implemented to regulate Security
and use IT resources?”
 Two of the six surveyed institutions have already a published Acceptable use pol-
icy while three have “partially implemented” this. Only one institution is “close
to completion”. On ICT security policy, one institution indicated that are they
have “not implemented” the publishing of their information security policy. The
remainder are “close to completion” or have “fully implemented” this.
 One institution indicated that they have fully made the policies available to their
users both students and staff while the rest have either “partially implemented” this
or are “close to completion”.
 Five of the institutions indicated that they have “partially implemented” or are
“close to completion” on getting an effective way to communicate policy changes to
users while the remaining one indicated that they have “fully implemented” this.
 Half of the respondents have fully communicated the consequences for non-compliance
to their end users.
 Half of the respondents indicated that they do not include security-related clauses
and sections with their external vendors while the remainder indicated that they
are working to have this implemented.
4.4.1 Policy
A policy is a plan or course of action that conveys instructions from an organization’s
senior management to those who make decisions, take actions, and perform other duties
[Michael and Herbert, 2010]. Policies can also be designed to be issue specific, for example
information security policies are policies that are designed provide guidelines to protect
information resources of an organisation.
It was good to note that all institutions either already have a published Acceptable use
policy or are working towards one and many of the institutions are working towards get-
ting their Security policies published. Policies are very instrumental in helping define
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business goals and how the users of information resources in the institution are supposed
to behave. Policies among other things can be used to control and or regulate the use
of electronic resources such as the Internet, student data, confidentiality, illegal activities
such as hacking and accessing pornographic sites [Fui-Hoon et al., 2002]. Policy design-
ers should however, be careful to design policies that do not hinder staff from executing
legitimate work but rather provide guidelines for responsible use of resources. Polices
should also be as detailed as possible and leave no room for guessing intention during
interpretation.
Policies especially security policies should also be designed to include external vendors,
this is to protect the institution and its data in case the vendors come across confiden-
tial information. Involving vendors in awareness campaigns also helps vendor companies
understand their role in the security of the institution and the consequences for non-
compliance.
For policies to be successful, they must meet the following conditions:
Dissemination
Policies should be readily available to the staff of the organisation if they are to be put
in practice. Changes to the policy must also be effectively disseminated [Fui-Hoon et al.,
2002]. Possible ways of dissemination can include notice boards and electronically over
organisation email lists. It was good to note that all institutions are already working on
ways to disseminate their policies to their users. It should be noted that all institutions
indicated the full understanding of this need and are all working towards devising best
means of disseminating their polices.
Awareness
Management should be able to devise means of making their employees aware of the
policy documents and their part in the overall picture of satisfying policy requirements.
Awareness should be started by the employees fully understanding the institutions assets
and why they should be protected. They should also understand the type of actions that
can violate company policies for resources usage [Goetz, Johnson, and Pfleeger, 2009].
If the employees are aware of the assets and the need to protect them they are able to
disarm any attempts made by attackers such as social engineering techniques.
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Understandable
Policies should be understandable to all employees, if necessary they should be interpreted
into various languages to make sure that the message cuts across the entire organisation.
Management must make sure that all employees understand the contents of the policy,
this can be done in form of group quizzes and puzzles.
Compliance
Policies should be very clear on the consequences for non-compliance and the penalties for
each. It is also important that the penalties are the same across the board and enforced
as directed by the policy. From the results, only 1/3 of the institutions have implemented
this.
4.4.2 Data Classification
Two thirds of the surveyed institutions indicated that their policies do not classify the
data that is stored on their servers and computers while one-third indicated that they are
“close to completion” or have “fully implemented” this. Half of the surveyed instutitons
indicated that their policies do not specify what kind of information about the institution
can be taken home while the other half indicated that they are “close to completion” or
have “fully implemented” this. On taking institutional devices home, two thirds of the
surveyed institutions indicated that they do not have policies that specify who is allowed
to take institutional devices off the institutions premises while one-third indicated that
they have this “fully implemented”.
Two thirds of the surveyed institutions indicated that they have “not implemented” or
have “partially implemented” the strategy to specify how inter-department and office com-
munication should be done while one-third indicated that they have “fully implemented”
this.
Data Classification is the conscious decision to assign a level of sensitivity to data as it is
being created, amended, enhanced, stored, or transmitted. The classification of data and
documents is essential if you are to differentiate between that which is of less value, and
that which is highly sensitive and confidential. When data is stored, whether received,
created or amended, it should always be classified into an appropriate sensitivity level.
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For many organisations, a simple 5 scale grade will suffice as follows Top Secret, Highly
Confidential, Proprietary, Internal Use only, Public Documents [Festus, 2008].
Data classification can greatly assist employees of the institution in the determining which
documents they can share freely with other parties especially those who are not members
of the institutions. it can also determine which kind of records can be taken off the
institutions premises say to home for staff to continue working. Some of the documents
that may pose serious security consequences are enrolment records, accounts records and
students personal information.
4.4.3 Summary
 33% have already a published Acceptable Use Policy (All have a document waiting
approval).
 83% are currently working on their information security policies.
 16% have already made the policies available to their users.
 All institutions are either working or already have a way of disseminating policy
changes to their users.
 33% have communicated to their users consequences for non-compliance.
 33% have included security-related clauses in vendor contracts.
 33% have classified their data.
 33% have their policies specifying what data can be taken home.
 66% of the policies do not specify who is allowed to take devices off premises.
 66% of the policies do not specify how inter-department communication should be
done.
Overall, all institutions have an ICT policy written. However most of the institutions
have not published their policies and have also not sensitized their users on the contents
of the policies.
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Figure 4.4: Policy Summary
4.5 Self Assessment
Self Assessment was assessed using common keywords used in information security to
represent most common attacks and technologies. The respondents were asked to indicate
their level of understanding of each of the terms. The respondents were also asked to rate
the information security readiness of their institutions. This section answers the question
“How does the respondent access the institution’s readiness to fight information security
challenges?”
The respondents were asked what their knowledge was of the most common security
terms. These include “Firewalls”, “Virtual Private Networks”, “Botnets”, “Intrusion De-
tection Systems”, “Spyware”, “Patching”, “Rootkits”, “VLANs”, “0-days”, “Anti-Virus
Software”, “Virii”, “Malware”, “DoS/DDoS”, “SQL Injection”, “Cross-Site Scripting”,
“Access Lists” and “Phishing”.
All the respondents indicated that they fully understood what the terms ”Firewalls”,
“Spyware”, “VLANs”, “Anti-Virus Software”, “Virii”, and “Malware” meant. This was
expected as these are the common terms used in information security. It was concerning
that none of the respondents knew about cross-site scripting and very few knew about
SQL injection, 0-days and botnets. Figure 4.5 shows a representation of the different
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words asked and the understanding of the respondents. Bigger sizes represent high level
of understanding and vice-versa.
Figure 4.5: Representation of respondents understanding of security-related terms
Respondents were asked to rate the information security readiness of their institutions.
The results are summarised in table 4.4.
Institution Readiness%
U 60
V 80
W 80
X 80
Y 60
Z 45
Table 4.4: Respondents perceived security readiness of their institutions
Respondents were asked to share areas in information security that they think their in-
stitutions can improve on and these were the areas mentioned; VPN, Data back up, hu-
man resource awareness, policy, having an operational policy, enforcing standard security
procedures such as authentication best practices, training of the line staff (IT section),
centralized network access management, honouring the budget aspect, and regular IT
audit.
4.6 Interview Questions
In this phase of the study, a pre-designed template was used to guide the interview session.
The intention of the guide was to obtained more qualitative information on some of the
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questions that were posed on the questionnaire. The guide was sent to the respondent
in advance of the interview sessions so that the respondent could get a good grasp of
the questions that were to be asked. All the interviews took place at the participating
institutions premises. A tape recorder was used to capture the interview session so that
the interviewer could be able to fully engage the respondent without having to transcribe
as well. The following is a summary of the results collected during the sessions. The
template used during this session can be found in Appendix B.
4.6.1 Changes with the Landing of SEACOM
All institutions identified a change with the landing of SEACOM. The landing of SEA-
COM at the East African coast provided easier access and cheaper bandwidth to East
African countries and their Internet consumers. The institutions had their bandwidth
doubled as was the the requirement from RENU for institutions to maintain their current
expenditures on bandwidth so that subsequent reductions in bandwidth market prices
continue to offer the institutions more bandwidth. Currently, among the participants in
the survey the highest consumer of bandwidth is consuming 40mbps while the lowest is
consuming 2mbps. Some institutions noted that with increased bandwidth, they have
already added the number of computers to provide students with more access points to
the Internet. Also it was noted that the numbers of students who own laptops increased
significantly. This increase could can be attributed to the facts that reduction of Internet
costs had made institutions able to provide more wireless points for student access and or
that the governments waiver on taxes for computer equipment makes it easier for many
students to afford laptops and other portable Internet ready devices.
4.6.2 Central Authentication Database
Only two institutions have implemented central authentication databases for their users.
The first institution made use of Microsoft Active Directory, the second institution used
Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) for authentication. The other institutions had
not made any efforts to move in this direction. Central authentication is very crucial
in an environment such as an academic institution. Academic institutions have many
users ranging from staff to students, as well as guests that make use of the network and
computer points available. Not being able to control who has access to which resources
can be very dangerous since some users might use these resource to abuse systems on
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the network or systems of other networks. Also centralising authentication helps in the
management of user identities from creation to deletion. As a result users who have
already left the institutions are unable to return and use institutional resources.
4.6.3 Campus Wireless Systems
Most of the institutions have a campus wireless system. Only one institution did not
have a wireless system on campus. Among those that had wireless systems, the coverage
range varied from 50 percent coverage to 100 percent coverage. Security implemented on
the wireless systems varied from open access to MAC-address filtering to WPA and WEP
encryption security. In general all institutions had grasped the need to have a way of
controlling access to their networks over wireless LAN. None of the institutions had any
means of knowing the number of users who were connected at a given time or whether all
those who were connected were legally registered students and staff and not rogue users.
All institutions had an oﬄine method of knowing how many laptop users were registered
to use the wireless system since access is only provided after registration.
4.6.4 Information Security Incidents
More than half the institutions had faced an information security incident in the past. The
incidents seemed to indicate an insider threat. Incidents such as “an accountant changing
accounts records” to “students changing results in the academic records system” and
“a cleaner in the ICT department who was stealing server hard drives from a running
server”. It is important to note that all incidents were noticed many weeks after they
had occurred. Also during the course of this study two institutions experienced external
security incidents. One institution’s website was hacked, another institution’s border
gateway router was hacked and the running configuration erased. In both incidents, no
post-incident auditing was performed so it is difficult to know whether they involved
data loss or further attacks. On detection of possible on-going attacks, two institutions
noted that they were able to detect if they were under attack by monitoring an Anti-Virus
central logging dashboard and by monitoring server logs. However none of the institutions
had a procedure to follow in order to mitigate such an attack if it were detected.
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4.6.5 Blacklists
Half of the institutions public IP addresses had been blacklisted. Two of these institutions
mentioned that the reason for the blacklist was as a result of virus activity on the network
and the blacklist had been imposed by their upstream Internet providers. Their Internet
connection service was stopped until the offending computers and subnets were discovered
and isolated. The other institution that faced a blacklist was as a result of a user who
shared the institution’s credentials to access an online research journal with users on
a torrent site and, as a result, the institutions credentials were being used by users in
other parts of the world. The offended database shut down the institution’s access to the
database and a new set of credentials and guidelines were issued to the institution from
the database’s security administrators.
4.6.6 Physical Security
More than half the institutions reported a physical break-in into the ICT department.
One of the institutions mentioned that “petty items” such as mouses, keyboards and
monitors were stolen during the break-in while another noted that nothing was reported
missing after the break-in. Another institution noted that the break-in led to the leaking
of examinations. Only one institution mentioned that they had changed the office locks as
part of the post-incident action. The rest of the institutions did not do any post-incident
actions.
4.6.7 Operating Systems in use
All institutions were using a mix of Unix/Linux and Windows operating systems. It was
found that Linux was mainly used as a server operating system for most of the institutions,
although one institution used Linux as both its server and client operating systems. The
favourite Unix/Linux distributions were FreeBSD, CentOS, Ubuntu and Fedora. The
institutions that were running Windows on their clients were running a combination of
Microsoft Windows XP, Windows Vista and Windows 2003 on their servers. Out of all
the institutions, only one institution was actively patching their systems and auditing the
patching process regularly.One other institution mentioned that the patching process is
left to the individual users that make use of the computer while the rest of the institutions
did not seem to do any managed patching at all.
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4.6.8 Border Firewall use
More than half of the institutions are running border firewalls. However, of the institution
that are running firewalls, none are performing any firewall auditing to make sure that the
rules have not been changed and that the rules on their firewalls are running according
to their policies. Of all the institutions running a firewall, only one had had the firewall
implemented by a resident network administrator. The remaining institutions’ firewalls
had been implemented by former systems or network administrators and - in one case -
had their firewall implemented by their Internet Service Provider.
4.6.9 IT Auditing
Only one institution had performed IT auditing in the past. The respondent from this
institution mentioned that he remembered the audit from many years before but had
never seen the report of the audit process.
4.7 Summary
This chapter presented the results and analysis of the data that was collected during the
period of the research. It also included the responses of the interview sessions that were
carried out with the respondents.
The following are some of the key findings that were discovered from the results of the
study:
 Half of the institutions had between 401 – 800 staff and more than 5001 students.
 Half of the institutions spend between 10% – 20% of their ICT budget on information
security related expenses.
 Half of the institutions were using more than three information systems including
Financial Management Systems, Email Systems and Website Content Management
Systems (CMS).
 66% indicated that they employ third-party service providers such as software de-
velopers and that these providers do not go through secure recruitment processes.
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 66% of the institutions have not implemented a way to monitor their networks or
to detect unauthorized use or rogue access points.
 66% have already designed and implemented a back-up strategy. Of those, all have
also tested the strategy for successful restoration.
 All institutions have a fully functional ICT department, although only 33% have an
information security function within the ICT department.
 Only two of the institutions (33%) have already published an Acceptable Use Policy
although only one has made this policy document available to their users.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the information security practices put in
place by the member institutions of Research and Education Network of Uganda (RENU)
to safeguard institution information assets and systems from both internal and external
security threats.
Although the initial study was to be conducted on all nine members of the Research and
Education Network of Uganda, only six member institutions responded positively to take
part in the study. As this was greater than half of the existing members, this researcher
felt that the results obtained provide a valid overall picture of what is happening in the
NREN and could be used to draw conclusions and offer recommendations to the NREN.
5.1 Research Overview
The following section offers the conclusions that have been drawn from the data collected.
The conclusions are presented based on the research questions that were used during data
collection.
5.1.1 Research Question 1: “What is the institution’s reliance
on ICT systems and services?”
The study found that the participating institutions were heavily reliant on ICT systems
and services. This was exhibited by the fact that all institutions had already implemented
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more than three information systems of those that were asked during the study including
financial management systems, email systems and website management systems. Other
indicators of heavy reliance on ICT systems included: the numbers of computing facilities
available to staff and student use, availability of remote access systems (such as wireless
systems), the perceived severity of system failure and loss of Internet connectivity to the
institution (more than half of the institutions indicated that it would be critical to the
proper functioning of the institution).
One indicator - “percentage of ICT budget spent on security” - that had been included
on the questionnaire was not considered due to diversity in the financial management
of ICT and security needs at the various institutions.. Some of the institutions spend
on security related infrastructure from the central budget of the university while other
institutions spend from the ICT department budget. In such cases it is difficult to clearly
articulate the exact institutions’ spending on security. Ignoring which budget is drawn
from for security related expenditure, one key factor to note is that all but one institution
spends on information security infrastructure. The exception made use of free, open
source security solutions. Nonetheless, the heavy reliance on information systems in the
universities that participated in the study is a strong indicator that these institutions
should have a vested interest in ensuring their systems are protected from information
security incidences.
5.1.2 Research Question 2: “What IT security infrastructure
has been deployed at the institution?”
Based on findings of this study, institutions have already acquired and implemented some
of the cutting edge equipment and systems, such as high-end border routers, and the
latest operating systems, such as Linux and Microsoft Windows 7 and Server 2008. In
addition, some of the institutions had already implemented more than one security layer
such as gateway firewalls, application firewalls and anti-virus software on client machines.
All institutions were found to have already implemented a backup strategy although none
had tested their strategy to make sure it is effective.
As much as newer security technologies were found to be implemented at all institutions,
the absence of guiding information security policies at the institutions meant that all these
technologies were being implemented subconsciously and in so doing partially improving
the overall information security posture. Because of the fast evolving global information
security community, many makers of hardware and systems have hardened them for hostile
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deployments such that by default some systems with no intervention of on-site security
administrators are secure. A good example of such systems are the Windows 7 and Linux
operating systems that have been designed by their vendors to be secure by default. Many
of the institutions had the latest hardware, such as routers, and operating systems, such
as Windows 7 and Windows Server 2008, which improved their overall security posture.
None of these institutions, however, monitored these systems for abuse, nor whether they
were adequately configured to defend the services they are running.
5.1.3 Research Question 3: “What is the staff composition of
the ICT department?”
This question was asked in order to ascertain whether the institution had an ICT depart-
ment and - in the event that it did - the kind of roles that exist in this department.
According to the data collected, all institutions have an established ICT department that
oversees the distribution of ICT services in the institutions. More than half the institu-
tions have ICT staff whose responsibility is security of the institution’s information assets.
It was found that all security roles in the organizations were merged with other roles and,
in addition, none of the staff were equipped with industry standard security qualifications
such as Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), Certified Ethical
Hacker (CEH), or the Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA) certifications. It
was also found that none of the institutions carry out background checks before they hire
ICT staff.
As discussed in the literature review, one of the challenges that institutions face when
implementing information security practices is the lack of available information security
staff. In John et al. [2003], the author mentions that universities are normally constrained
to employ full time staff to run the security function of the ICT department. This was
evident as no institution had a full time information security employee on the ICT team.
The lack of a full time security employee hinders the security function since the employee
who is assigned information security duties will have to juggle them with his other duties.
With this revelation, it was no surprise that no institution had an ongoing information
security program. According to [Lowendahl et al., 2006] the most-important step that
an institution can take to strengthen its security efforts is the appointment of a Chief
Information Security Officer (CISO). The document further stresses that the institutions
should not stop at designating a CISO but should also give their newly appointed CISO
the necessary mandate to drive the information security program.
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5.1.4 Research Question 4: “What policies has the institution
implemented to guide students and staff on the proper
use of ICT resources?”
Based on findings from the study, all institutions have a written ICT policy, however few
institutions published their policies. It was also found that institutions do not carry out
policy sensitization and awareness campaigns for their staff and students. The composition
of the policies was found to be lacking, with none of the institutions classifying how
information should be handled in the institution. Also none of the institutions include
security related clauses in their contracts with third-party service providers.
A number of studies Goetz et al. [2009] stress that policy should be the starting point
of any information security program in any organization. In this case the absence of
published information security policies not only means absence of information security
programs at these institutions but also invalidate all attempts by institutions to implement
information security practices. Nonetheless, even in the absence of a guiding policy, this
study considered the various efforts made by the institutions to implement standalone
information security practices as valid and commendable.
5.1.5 Research Question 5: “How does the respondent assess
the institution’s readiness to fight information security
challenges?”
Respondents assessed that their institutions were ready to fight information security chal-
lenges. Most of the respondents felt that their institutions were 80 percent ready to
fight information security challenges. Also from the results, the respondents had primary
knowledge of information security and this could be seen from the security terms that
they were able to identify. Users were able to identify and exhibit better understanding of
terms such as “anti-virus”, “firewall” and “spyware”, but were not able to identify more
advanced terms like “cross site scripting” and “SQL injection”.
Despite the fact that respondents felt that their institutions were ready to fight infor-
mation security challenges, other key indicators - especially lack of policy - suggested
otherwise, as the security program of any organization can only be guided by its policy.
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5.2 Validity of this Study and Results
The purpose of this study was to investigate the information security practices put in
place by the member institutions of Research and Education Network of Uganda (RENU)
to safeguard institutions’ information assets and systems from both internal and external
security threats. This document presented the results of the study. This researcher feels
that the results are valid because of the following reasons:
5.2.1 Sample space
The research targeted all members of the Research and Education Network of Uganda.
RENU, as a “young” NREN, only has nine member institutions out of the more than
twenty institutions of higher learning that are in the country. The study obtained six
positive responses from the contacted members, constituting more than half the members
of the NREN at the time. As a result, it is believed that the results obtained from these
members can be used to provide an accurate picture on the information security posture
of the NREN.
5.2.2 Respondents
In the study participation invitation that was sent to institutions, this researcher asked
the head of the various ICT departments to nominate an individual who had information
on the security practices of the institution. Typically such an individual would be the
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). None of the institutions was found to have
a CISO, so the heads of the institutions’ departments nominated some other individual
who they believed would be qualified to answer the questions. In some cases, the heads of
department nominated themselves. In one instance a librarian answered the questionnaire
as he is the head of department for ICT. Since the heads of department should be aware
of the information security program, the information obtained from the respondents is
deemed correct and a true representation of the institution’s ICT security program.
5.2.3 Timing of the study
The study was meant to investigate the information security practices put in place by the
member institutions of Research and Education Network of Uganda (RENU) to safeguard
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institutions’ information assets and systems from both internal and external security
threats. Based on the title of the study, the researcher assumed that the universities had an
information security program already in place and that the study would try to understand
how it had been implemented, in addition to any merits they may have. It was discovered
in the course of the research that none of the institutions had an ongoing security program.
Nonetheless, since the institutions have standalone information security procedures in
place, the researcher considers them major contributors to the overall security posture of
the institution and therefore considers them valid indicators in the study.
5.2.4 Summary
The study on information security practices put in place by RENU member institutions to
protect institution systems and data from security incidences discovered that institutions
have not implemented appropriate practices and procedures to protect these systems and
data. This conclusion is supported by the fact that none of the institutions have created
nor published an information security policy. Policy is supposed to be the guiding tool
that is used during the implementation of these procedures and practices. For example,
all institutions were found to have cutting edge equipment and software systems imple-
mented at their institutions. However, even with such advantages, these systems were not
configured appropriately nor monitored for information security incidences, hence they
did not perform optimally.
5.3 Future Research
The area of information security is still in its infancy in Uganda, in both industry and
educational institutions. With the increase use of computing systems for both storage
and access to information, it becomes a necessity for administrators of institutions to
take information security seriously and implement information security controls to protect
their systems and data.
 This study only focused on educational institutions that are members of the Re-
search and Education Network of Uganda. In the case of Uganda, there are only
nine universities that are currently members of RENU out of the over 20 universities
that exist in the country. Future research work, especially if the members of the
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NREN do not increase, could focus on all tertiary education institutions in order to
get a clearer picture of the information security trends within education institutions
in the country.
 Research on information security areas within National Research and Education
Networks, especially on the African continent, are still not available. Future studies
in this area could be beneficial for comparison purposes with results from other
NRENs, especially within UBUNTUNet alliance which brings together NRENs in
East and Southern Africa.
 In this study, the survey instrument that was used was customized from another
tool that was originally developed by EDUCAUSE for the assessment of universities
in the United States of America. Future studies could evaluate the possibility of
designing a tool that could be used to evaluate security practises of NRENs on the
African continent.
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Appendix A
Consent Form
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Department of Computer Science 
 
 
Project Title:  An Investigation into Information Security Practices implemented by Research 
and Educational Network of Uganda (RENU) Member Institutions 
 
Researcher’s names: Researcher: Alex Kisakye  Supervisor: Dr. Barry Irwin 
 
 
 
 I have received information about this research project. 
 
 I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement in it. 
 
 I understand that I may withdraw from the research project at any stage. 
 
 I understand that participation in this study is done on a voluntary basis. 
 
 I understand that while information gained during the study may be published, I will not be 
identified and my personal results will remain confidential. 
 
 I understand that I will receive no payment for participating in this study. 
 
 
Name:   
 
 
 
Signed   Date   
 
 
I have provided information about the research and believe that participant understands what is 
involved. 
 
 
Researchers signature and Date     
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Proposed Interview Questions. 
1. Did you notice a change in the utilization of computing resources with the landing of the 
SEACOM cable? Please give details. 
2. Are you using the same database for authentication across all application systems? If yes, which 
vendor authentication database is used? 
3. If a campus-wide wireless system is available, what is its coverage? What security has been 
implemented on it? Do you know the number of users allowed to use the wireless system? 
4. Do you have means of knowing characteristics of the users using the wireless network at any 
time e.g. numbers, legitimate users 
5. Have you experience an information security (IS) incident before? Please give details. 
6. Do you have means of knowing in real-time if you are under attack? 
7. Do you have a procedure to follow once and IS attack has been detected? 
8. Has any of your public IP address space been blacklisted before? 
9. Can you describe how the reason for the blacklist was discovered and how it was remediated? 
10. Have you had any information security incidents in your department before? What type of 
incidences were they? How were they discovered? Where any measures taken post-discovery to 
prevent future attacks? 
11. What are the biggest security threats to your systems? How have you responded to prevent 
such threats from happening? 
12. Has your department ever been physically broken into? How was the break-in discovered? Did 
you manage to find anything missing after this incident? 
13. Do you have a disaster recovery plan? Who is responsible for administration and coordination of 
the plan? Where is the disaster recovery plan stored? Do you have an offsite backup location? 
Have you ever had to use the backup plan? If yes please describe the incident that let to its use. 
14. Do you have an intuition-wide anti-virus? How regularly do the clients update their virus 
databases? Does someone regularly check the AV providers’ site to discover new known 
viruses? 
15. What operating systems does the institution use for desktops and servers? How is patching 
managed? Do you actively look at vendor sites for new vulnerabilities? Do you actively audit 
system patching process? 
16. Do you use a border firewall? Who implemented the firewall? Who is responsible for making 
necessary changes? Is there a policy that determines what kind of traffic to let through or block? 
Are the changes on the firewall authorized and documented? Are the firewall rules regularly 
audited for consistency with the documentation? 
17. Do you carry out an audit of your IT systems? If yes, is the auditing done in-house or by a third-
party service provider? If you are using a third party provider, have you taken the necessary 
procedures to have a non-disclosure agreement? How often is the auditing done? 
18. Are all public facing systems like website regularly monitored for consistency? Are the 
webserver logs monitors for any unexpected behavior?  
19. Do you have an Acceptable use policy? Do you have an information security policy? Are copies 
of these documents readily available to your users? Have these documents been mandated by 
top management? Do the documents clearly specify which resources are to be protected? Do 
the documents clearly mention the consequences for non-compliance? 
20. Are staff allowed to take off campus university equipment and information? 
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Questionnaire 
 
Role of Respondent in the organization………................................................................................................. 
SECTION 1 
Institutional Profiling 
This section assesses the Institutions’ reliance on Information Technology systems and services. 
1.  Select Appropriate score [A, B, C etc.] and filling the score section. Score 
1.1 What is your average annual ICT budget (in UGX)? 
Less than 100Million = A 
101Million to 300Million = B 
301Million to 600Million = C 
601Million to 1Billion = D 
1Billion and over = E 
 
1.2 What is your annual average spending on Security related services and products? 
E.g. Anti-virus, IDS etc. 
0 = A 
1Million to 20Million = B 
21Million to 50Million = C 
51Million to 150Million = D 
151Million to 300Million = E 
301Million and over = F 
 
1.3 What is the; 
number of staff institution-wide? 
1 – 200 = A 
201 – 400 = B 
401 – 800 = C 
801 – 1600 = D 
1601 – 3000 = E 
3001 and over = F 
 
1.4 number of Students? 
1 – 500 = A 
500 – 2000 = B 
2001 – 5000 = C 
5001 – 15000 = D 
15001 – 40000 = E 
40001 and over = F 
 
1.5 number of computers connected to the internet (both available to staff and 
students)? 
Less than 100 = A 
101 – 300 = B 
301 – 800 = C 
801 – 1500 = D 
1501 – 3000 = E 
3001 and over = D 
 
 
 
 
1.6 Please select all the systems that your institution uses. 
 
Select all that 
apply [X or √] 
Academic Records Management Information System  
Financial Management System  
Students Management System  
Library Information System  
Learning Management System  
Alumni Management system  
Email System  
Website System (content management system)  
Other systems  
  
 Impact Assessment of System failure or loss of internet connectivity (Note scoring, 
A=None, B=Partial, C=Critical, D=Unacceptable 
 
1.7 What is the impact of system failure on the following A B C D 
i.) Internal Business processes of the institution (e.g. Registration)?     
ii.) Business process between the university and external sources?     
What is the impact of loss of internet connectivity on the following A B C D 
i.) Internal Business processes of the institution (e.g. Registration)?     
ii.) Business processes between the university and external sources?     
1.8 Do you contract third party entities for any of your business processes (e.g. software 
development, network expansions)? 
 
 
1.9 Do you have persons that work in the offices but are not on the Institutions’ Payroll system (e.g. 
office-helps, cleaners, interns)? 
 
 
1.10 Does your institution have a wireless access system for staff and student device access? 
 
 
1.11 If you answered yes in 1.7, what encryption is in use? 
No Encryption = A 
WPA = B 
WEP = C 
 
1.12 Do you provide for staff and students a means to access university systems remotely? 
 
 
   
 
 
 
YES NO 
YES NO 
YES NO 
YES NO 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
 Section 2: 
Infrastructure: Software and Hardware 
This section assesses the current Security Infrastructure that has been deployed by the Institution. 
Grading for this section is as follows; 
A= Not implemented, B =Partially Implemented, C= Close to Completion, D = Fully Implemented 
2.1 Are internet-accessible servers protected by more than one security layer? (firewall, 
network IDS, Application IDS) 
 
2.2 Are your networks, systems, and applications periodically scanned to check for 
vulnerabilities as well as integrity of configuration files? 
 
2.3 Do you constantly monitor in real time your networks, systems and applications for 
unauthorized access and anomalous behaviors such as viruses, malicious code insertion, 
or break-in attempts? 
 
2.4 Are security-related activities such as hardware configuration changes, software 
configuration changes, access attempts, and authorization and privilege assignments 
automatically logged? 
 
2.5 Is sensitive data encrypted and associated encryption keys properly protected?  
2.6 Are there effective and reliable mechanisms in place to manage digital identities (user 
accounts, keys, tokens) throughout their life-cycle, from registration through termination? 
 
2.7 Do all of your systems and applications support and enforce automatic password change 
management or automatic expiration of passwords, as well as password complexity and 
reuse rules? 
 
2.8 Do your systems and applications enforce session/user management practices including 
automatic timeouts, lockout on login failure, and revocation? 
 
2.9 Do you employ specific measures to prevent and detect rogue access for all of your 
wireless LANs? 
 
2.10 Do you employ specific measures to secure remote access to your servers?  
2.11 Do you employ specific measures to secure the servers that manage your network domain 
names and addresses (DNS and DHCP servers)? 
 
2.12 Is every workstation and server protected with centrally managed anti-virus?  
2.13 Is there an audit trail to verify that virus definitions files are updated frequently and 
systematically? 
 
2.14 Is every desktop workstation and server updated regularly with the latest operating 
system patches from a central update server? 
 
2.15 Taking into account severity and urgency, are there mechanisms in place to report and 
respond to a variety of anomalies and security events? 
 
2.16 Is there a current system backup strategy?  
2.17 Does the backup strategy cover all critical systems in the institution?  
2.18 Are the backup procedures periodically tested to make sure recovery is possible?  
2.19 Are all system configuration changes done according to policy and the changes 
documented?  
 
2.20 Do all your applications have a central database for authenticating users (e.g. LDAP)?  
   
 
 
  
 
 
Section 3: 
Human Resource and Awareness: 
This section assesses the human resource component of the Institutions Information Security resources.  
Grading for this section is as follows; 
A= Not implemented, B =Partially Implemented, C= Close to Completion, D = Fully Implemented 
3.1 Does your institution have an organized ICT department whose role is to oversee the use 
of Information technology resources? 
 
 How many staff are in your ICT department? 
……………………………………………………. 
3.2 Is there a security function in any of the duties of ICT personnel (independent or merged)?  
 How many staff are assigned to the security function in your department? 
………………………………………………….. 
3.3 Does your information security function have the authority it needs to manage and ensure 
compliance with the information security program? 
 
3.4 Does your information security function have the resources it needs to manage and 
ensure compliance with the information security program? 
 
3.5 Is there effort to train ICT personnel in security related courses?  
3.6 Do ICT personnel have ICT security qualifications? If yes please list them below. 
a.) 
b.) 
c.) 
d.) 
 
3.7 Do you have an ICT security awareness program that caters for the whole institution?  
3.8 Does your institution carry out background checks on ICT employees e.g. check out 
references of the employees that are hired to perform ICT functions? 
 
3.9 Do you have a central place where all institutions’ systems are stored (i.e. server room, 
data center)? 
 
   
   
 
  
  
Section 4: 
Policy: 
This section assesses the Institutions’ policy on usage of the ICT resources and services. 
Grading for this section is as follows; 
A= Not implemented, B =Partially Implemented, C= Close to Completion, D = Fully Implemented 
4.1 Does your institution have a published Acceptable Use Policy?  
4.2 Does your institution have a published Information Security policy?  
4.3 Are the policies readily available to your users [students and staff]?  
4.4 Do you have an effective means of communicating policy changes to your users?  
4.5 Are the consequences of non-compliance clearly communicated and enforced?  
4.6 Are relevant security policies included in all third-party contracts?  
4.7 Do the relevant policies classify the data and information that is stored on the systems or 
shared between departments (e.g. confidential, sensitive)? 
 
4.8 Do the relevant policies specify what kind of data or information about the institution can 
be taken home by staff members? 
 
4.9 Do the relevant policies specify who is allowed to take institutional devices off the 
institutional premises (e.g. Laptops)? 
 
4.10 Do you have policies and procedures that describe how inter-department and office 
communication should be done? 
 
   
   
 
  
 Section 5: 
Self-Assessment: 
This section assesses the respondents knowledge of some of the terms from Information Security field. 
Grading for this section is as follows; 
A= Don’t Know, B =Not Sure, C= Know about it, D = Fully Understand 
5.1 The following terms are from the Information Security field; please indicate your 
understanding of each term. 
 
 Firewall  
 Virtual Private Network  
 botnet  
 Intrusion Detection System  
 Spyware  
 Patching  
 rootkit  
 VLAN  
 Patching  
 0-day  
 Anti-Virus  
 Virus  
 Malware  
 Denial of Service /Distributed Denial of Service  
 SQL injection  
 Cross Site Scripting  
 Access Lists  
 Phishing  
5.2 On a scale of 0 - 100%, How would you describe the level of Information security readiness 
of your institution? 
 
5.2 Can you think of areas that you need to work on as an Institution to improve your 
Information security readiness.[ Please use separate sheet if necessary] 
 
 
